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BPD	 Badan Perwakilan Desa,	 Village	 Representative	 Assembly	 (village-level	
legislative	body)
BUMN	 Badan Usaha Milik Negara,	State-owned	company
BUMS	 Badan Usaha Milik Swasta,	Privately-owned	company
Dephut	(bun)	 Departemen Kehutanan dan Perkebunan,	Ministry	of	Forestry	and	Estate	Crops
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No.	 35/2002,	Article	 1,	 paragraph	 1	 these	 are	 funds	 for	 reforestation,	 forest	
rehabilitation	and	supporting	activities	collected	from	HPHH	concessionaires.)
FGD	 Focus Group Discussion,	A	method	whereby	participants	discuss	problems	and	
find solutions together
HP	 Hutan Produksi,	Production	Forest	
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TGHK	 Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan, Forest	Land	Use	by	Consensus
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vPreface
This	 case	 study	 is	 part	 of	 a	 series	 describing	
the	impacts	of	decentralization	in	the	forestry	
sector	 in	 Indonesia.	 Over	 the	 last	 two	 years	
(2002–2004),	 a	 team	 of	 researchers	 from	
regional	 universities,	 NGOs	 and	 CIFOR	
worked	 on	 a	 policy	 action	 research	 project:	
‘Can	Decentralization	Work	for	Forests	and	the	
Poor?,	intended	to	help	inform	policy	decision	
making.	 The	 research	 has	 involved	 working	
with multi-stakeholder networks in five 
provinces	 across	 Indonesia	 (South	 Sulawesi,	
East	Kalimantan,	Jambi,	West	Kalimantan	and	
Papua)	in	gathering	and	sharing	detailed	socio-
legal,	economic	and	ecological	analyses	of	the	
impacts	of	decentralization	on	forestry	and	the	
poor.	
The	 foundations	 for	 decentralizing	
Indonesia’s	 highly	 centralized	 governance	
system	were	 laid	out	 in	Law	No.	22/1999	on	
Regional	 Governance	 and	 Law	 No.	 25/1999	
on	Fiscal	Balancing	 between	 the	Central	 and	
Regional	 Governments.	 Decentralization	 has	
provided	district	governments	with	considerable	
opportunities	 to	 reform	 their	 governance,	
development	and	public	service	delivery.	The	
most	tangible	manifestation	of	decentralization	
in	 the	 forestry	 sector	 was	 that	 district	 heads	
were	given	authority	to	grant	small-scale	forest	
concessions for the first time.
The first two years of decentralization in 
Indonesia	represented	a	time	of	transition	and	
adjustment.	Forest-rich	districts	celebrated	this	
new freedom to gain direct economic benefits 
by	 establishing	 district	 timber	 regimes.	As	 a	
result	there	was	a	boom	in	small-scale	logging.	
The	 national	 government	 reacted	with	 a	 new	
set	 of	 forestry	 policies	 attempting	 to	 limit	
forest	degradation,	mainly	by	curbing	district	
authority.	At	about	the	same	time,	many	district	
governments	and	local	stakeholders	started	to	
realize	 that	 their	 level	 of	 timber	 exploitation	
was	not	sustainable.	In	these	districts,	a	process	
of	 policy	 learning	 led	 to	new,	more	 carefully	
considered	district	forestry	policies.	However,	
their	 potential	 was	 limited	 as	 the	 central	
government	 had	 already	 taken	 back	much	 of	
the	district’s	authority	for	forestry.	
Under	 the	New	Order	 regime,	 the	 forest	
governance	system	had	created	an	unsustainable	
timber	 extraction	 regime.	 It	 has	 also	 been	
described	 as	 a	 ‘poverty-creating’	 model	 of	
forest	 management	 (DFID	 1999)1.	 So	 far,	
decentralization	in	Indonesia	has	not	magically	
solved	 the	 problems	 built	 up	 over	 decades	
of	 over-exploitation	 and	 under-investment	
in	 natural	 resource-based	 development.	
Decentralization	 has	 undoubtedly	 brought	
short-term	economic	windfalls	to	some	forest-
dependent	communities,	and	brought	decision-
making	closer	to	local	stakeholders.	However,	if	
forest	and	eco-system	management	at	the	local	
level	 is	 to	be	sustainable,	all	 the	stakeholders	
who	will	be	impacted	by	government	policies	
in	 this	 area	 need	 still	 greater	 involvement.	
Their input should help to ensure that final 
policies	 provide	 them	with	 real	 opportunities	
to	 improve	 their	 livelihoods	 and	 the	 natural	
environment	within	a	framework	of	sustainable	
natural	resource	management.	
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Abstract
The	study	attempted	to	understand	the	dynamics	and	complexities	of	forest	resources	management	
following	decentralization,	the	interactions	among	stakeholders	in	forest	resources	management,	
and	the	impacts	of	the	new	legislation	on	local	community	livelihoods	in	Sintang	District,	West	
Kalimantan.	Forestry	 policies	 implemented	 in	 the	 district	 before	 and	 after	 the	 introduction	of	
legislation	granting	regional	autonomy	and	the	emergence	of	small-scale	timber	concessions	are	
described. Qualitative research methodologies, i.e. semi-structured interviews, field observations 
and	 workshops,	 were	 used.	 The	 results	 show	 that	 the	 decentralization	 of	 forest	 management	
had	not	proceeded	smoothly	because	of	the	lack	of	regulations	governing	implementation,	and	
that	 the	decentralized	forest	policies	had	had	both	positive	and	negative	 impacts.	Focusing	on	
100-ha	forest	product	harvest	concessions	(HPHH),	the	study	examined	opportunities	for	local	
communities	 and	other	 stakeholders	 to	 participate	 in	 the	management	 of	 forest	 resources,	 the	
contributions	of	the	small-scale	forest	concessions	to	district	development	and	local	community	
livelihoods, and social conflicts arising from a complex combination of factors.

1INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and research
Alongside	their	global	value,	forests	are	a	vital	
resource	for	Indonesia.	Forests	generate	foreign	
exchange	for	the	state	economy	and	subsistence	
support	for	local	communities	for	whom	they	
also	 hold	 substantial	 sociocultural	 value.	 It	
has	 been	 estimated	 that	 the	 timber	 industry	
has	contributed	20	percent	of	national	revenue	
over	 the	 last	 few	 decades	 (Kartodihardjo	
1999)	 and	 provided	 widespread	 employment	
opportunities.	 Forests	 generate	 an	 average	
of	US$	 6	 billion	 in	 revenue	 per	 year	 and	 20	
to	30	million	people	are	directly	or	 indirectly	
employed	 in	 forestry	 (Sunderlin	et al.	 2000).	
On	a	 smaller	 scale,	 forests	 play	 an	 important	
role	 as	 a	 lifesource	 for	 local	 communities	
who	 depend	 on	 income	 and	 sustenance	 from	
harvesting	non-timber	products	such	as	rattan,	
resin,	medicinal	plants	etc.	Sacred	sites	within	
forests	are	also	used	for	important	rituals	and	
spiritual	 ceremonies	 by	 local	 communities	
across	Indonesia	(McCarthy	2002).	
For	more	than	30	years,	forest	management	
in	 Indonesia	was	extremely	centralized	under	
the	autocratic	New	Order	regime	(Resosudarmo	
2004).	 Forests	 were	 managed	 by	 large	 and	
well-connected	 companies	 that	 were	 given	
forest	concessions	 (Hak Pengusahaan Hutan,	
HPH)	 by	 the	 central	 government	 in	 Jakarta.	
Technically,	 HPH	 concessionaires	 were	
supposed	 to	 contribute	 to	 local	 community	
livelihoods	 through	 the	 so-called	 Village	
Development	 Programme	 (HPH Bina Desa);	
but	more	often	than	not	communities	received	
little if any benefits from large concessions 
operating	 in	 their	 area.	 In	 reality,	 the	 HPH	
system	 of	 forest	 management	 systematically	
marginalized	 local	 communities.	 It	 has	 been	
described	 as	 a	 ‘poverty	 creating	 model	 of	
forest	 development’	 and	 an	 ecologically	
unsustainable	 system	 (DFID	 1999).	 Worse	
still,	HPHs	often	left	local	communities	to	bear	
the	 brunt	 of	 environmental	 problems	 such	 as	
river pollution, floods, erosion and landslides. 
Social conflict between local communities and 
HPH	concessionaires	emerged	everywhere	as	a	
logical	consequence	of	the	manifold	problems	
brought	about	by	the	HPH	concession	system	
(Rhee	2000;	Yasmi	2003).
Soeharto’s	New	Order	regime	came	to	an	
end	in	1998,	in	the	wake	of	widespread	student	
demonstrations	 for	 democracy.	 Indonesia	
turned	a	new	page	in	its	history.	At	this	point,	it	
seemed	as	if	the	Indonesian	people’s	dream	of	
‘Reformasi’	was	about	to	become	reality.	With	
the	end	of	the	New	Order	era	came	new	hope	
for	socioeconomic	and	political	reform	across	
government,	 including	 in	 the	 notoriously	
corrupt	forestry	sector.	After	30	years	of	highly	
centralized	control	from	Jakarta,	there	was	also	
pressure	for	more	autonomous	government	for	
the	country’s	provinces	and	districts.	One	year	
later,	two	new	laws	laid	down	the	foundations	
for regional autonomy. Drawn up and ratified 
by	the	People’s	Consultative	Assembly	(MPR	
RI),	the	two	new	laws	were	Law	No.	22/1999	
on	Regional	Government	and	Law	No.	25/1999	
on	 Fiscal	 Balancing	 between	 Central	 and	
Regional	Governments.
Article	 7,	 paragraph	 1	 of	 Law	 No.	
22/1999	 provided	 regional	 governments	
with	 considerable	 authority	 in	 all	 areas	 of	
governance	 except	 security	 and	 defence,	 the	
judiciary,	 religion	 and	 national	monetary	 and	
fiscal policies. Following this transfer of power 
and	authority	 from	 the	central	government	 to	
provincial	 and	 district	 governments	 there	
were	 expectations	 that	 this	 new	 government	
structure would provide more efficient and 
equitable	 public	 services.	 Underlying	 this	
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expectation	was	the	notion	that	a	decentralized	
system	would	bring	decision	makers	physically	
closer	 to	 their	 constituents.	This	would	 incur	
lower	 transaction	 costs	 and	 enable	 active	
stakeholder	 participation	 in	 policy-making	
(Mody	2004).	There	were	high	hopes	that	a	new	
decentralized	system	of	government	would	be	
more	accountable.
The significant transfer of power and 
authority	from	central	to	regional	governments	
was seen by many to reflect a will to embrace 
the	 four	 pillars	 of	 good	 governance,	 namely:	
accountability,	 transparency,	 law	enforcement	
and	 public	 participation	 (see	 e.g.,	 Tambunan	
2000).	However,	in	his	latest	study	McCarthy	
has	 concluded	 that	 decentralization	 in	 the	
forestry sector has yet to fulfil initial high 
hopes.	 He	 writes	 ‘[..]	 Nonetheless,	 to	 date,	
the	politics	surrounding	decentralization	have	
occurred	under	 the	shade	of	 the	New	Order’s	
authoritarian	 heritage.	As	 these	 politics	work	
out	 at	 different	 levels,	 circumstances	 remain	
precariously	 distant	 from	 the	 objective	 of	
good	 governance’	 (McCarthy	 2004:	 p1200).	
However,	 the	 status	 of	 some	 communities	
and their comparative access to benefits has 
marginally	 improved	 since	 decentralization,	
albeit	with	short-lived	and	unsustainable	gains	
channelled	to	them	once	local	and	village	elites	
have	 had	 the	 lion’s	 share	 (McGrath	 et al.	 in	
press).
A	 fundamental	 problem	 standing	 in	
the	 way	 of	 improved	 governance	 following	
decentralization	 has	 been	 weak	 coordination	
among	the	parties	involved.	Central	government	
has failed to clearly define the delegation of 
power	and	authority	to	regional	governments.	
This is reflected in the lack of clear and distinct 
regulations	 on	 implementing	 decentralization	
in	 the	 forestry	 sector.	 Law	 No.	 22/1999	 and	
Law	 No.	 25/1999	 on	 decentralization	 and	
fiscal balancing were promulgated in 1999. 
No	 government	 regulations	 deriving	 from	
these two laws were issued specifically for the 
forestry	sector	before	2002.	
This	policy	vacuum	gave	rise	to	all	manner	
of	 political	 manoeuvring	 and	 speculation	
in	 Indonesia’s	 provinces	 and	 districts.	 Most	
regional	governments	looked	to	forest	resource	
management	to	generate	independent	regional	
own-source	revenues	(Pendapatan Asli Daerah	
or	 PAD).	 Districts	 exercised	 their	 new-found	
administrative	authority	by	issuing	small-scale	
forest	concessions	(often	called	100-ha	HPHH	
or	 Forest	 Product	 Harvest	 Concessions)	 to	
increase	their	PAD.	This	has	been	common	in	
the	 forestry	sector	 (see	e.g.,	Barr	et al.	2001;	
Casson	2001;	McCarthy	2001a,	b,	2004;	Samsu	
et al.	2004;	McGrath	et al.,	 in	press).	On	 the	
one	hand,	100-ha	HPHHs	generated	PAD	for	
the	regions.	They	have	created	relatively	better	
access	for	local	communities	to	forest	resources	
by	 providing	 them	with	 direct	 but	 short-term	
economic	gain.	On	the	other	hand,	the	arrival	
of	100-ha	HPHHs	has	also	had	some	negative	
impacts.	These	 include	 increased	degradation	
of	 forest	 resources,	 marginalization	 of	 forest	
communities,	 and	 more	 widespread	 illegal	
logging	 due	 to	 weak	 law	 enforcement	 and	
ambiguously defined tenure. In the short term, 
local	 communities,	 particularly	 local	 elites,	
have enjoyed some direct benefits from timber 
harvesting.	In	the	long	run,	the	environmental	
impacts	of	the	present	forest	extraction	policies	
are	 set	 to	 increase	 the	 insecurity	 of	 local	
communities’	livelihoods.
Our	research	found	positive	and	negative	
impacts	 resulting	 from	 decentralized	 forest	
policies	 in	West	Kalimantan,	where	 this	 case	
study	 was	 conducted.	 Through	 this	 research,	
we	sought	to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	how	
policies	have	been	formulated	and	implemented.	
We focused on how local stakeholders’ benefits 
have	 improved,	 the	 probable	 wider	 impacts	
on	 local	 communities,	 and	 the	 role	 the	 new	
policies have played in local conflicts over 
forest	 resources.	 Focusing	 on	 100-ha	 HPHH	
forest	product	harvest	concessions,	the	research	
examined	the	following	factors:
1.	 Opportunities	 for	 local	 communities	 and	
other	 stakeholders	 to	 participate	 in	 the	
management	 of	 forest	 resources,	 and	 the	
roles	they	play.
2.	 100-ha	HPHH	policy	and	its	contributions	
towards	 district	 development	 and	 local	
community	livelihoods.
3. Social conflicts arising from a complex 
combination	 of	 factors,	 in	 particular	 the	
100-ha	HPHH	policy.
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1.2 Research objectives
The	aims	of	this	study	were	to	investigate	the	
dynamics	and	complexities	of	forest	resources	
management	following	decentralization,	and	to	
understand	 interactions	 between	 stakeholders	
in	 forest	 resources	 management	 and	 their	
implications	for	 local	community	 livelihoods.	
We	 hope	 this	 research	 may	 be	 used	 as	 a	
reference	point	 for	managing	forest	 resources	
in	 West	 Kalimantan,	 particularly	 in	 Sintang	
District,	and	will	also	be	useful	for	comparison	
with	other	areas	of	Indonesia.	
1.3 Research questions
To	achieve	these	research	objectives	we	posed	
the	following	questions:
1.	 How	 were	 forestry	 sector	 policies	
implemented	in	the	forestry	sector	in	Sintang	
District	before	and	after	decentralization?
2.	 What	impacts	have	100-ha	HPHHs	had	on	
forest	resources,	PAD	and	local	community	
livelihoods?
3.	 What	 part	 has	 the	 new	 100-ha	 HPHHs	
played in local conflicts over forest 
resources?	
4.	 What	 challenges	 need	 to	 be	 overcome	 in	
order	to	achieve	good	forest	governance	in	
West	Kalimantan?
1.4 Research methods
We	 took	 a	 participatory	 approach	 to	 this	
research.	This	meant	 that	we	 tried	 to	actively	
involve	local	stakeholders	at	every	stage	of	the	
research	 process.	 To	 do	 this,	 it	 was	 essential	
for	researchers	to	maintain	good	relations	with	
stakeholders,	therefore	a	research	team	stayed	
with	local	communities	in	the	study	locations	
for	 eight	 months.	 This	 enabled	 researchers	
to	 observe	 local	 social	 dynamics,	 carry	 out	
participatory	research	activities,	and	document	
social	processes,	indicators	and	developments.	
By	 staying	 on	 site,	 researchers	 were	 able	 to	
earn	 the	 trust	 of	 local	 communities,	 making	
it	easier	 to	work	 together	 to	 identify	 research	
needs	and	share	sensitive	information.	
Stakeholders	 were	 involved	 in	 the	
following	participatory	research	activities:
1. Rapid rural appraisals	 (RRAs),	 which	
were	conducted	at	the	preliminary	stage	to	
determine	research	locations.
2. Focus group discussions	 (FGDs),	 which	
were	held	at	village,	district	and	provincial	
levels	with	all	relevant	stakeholders.
3. Participatory rural appraisals	 (PRAs),	
which	 were	 undertaken	 with	 local	
stakeholders,	 focusing	on	 residents	 in	 the	
research	locations.
4.	 District-level	 workshops,	 which	 were	
presented	to	gain	 input	from	stakeholders	
from	 across	 the	 district	 on	 research	
outcomes	and	future	options.
Along	 with	 these	 participatory	 research	
methods,	in-depth	interviews	were	held	with	71	
people	 including	 local	 community	 members,	
customary	 leaders,	 civil	 servants,	 security	
officers, District Forestry Officials, members 
of	the	legislature	and	members	of	cooperatives.	
A	complete	list	of	those	who	helped	with	this	
research	is	given	in	Annex	1.
The	 research	 team	 also	 interacted	 with	
other	 teams	 conducting	 similar	 research	 in	
the	 provinces	 of	 Jambi,	 East	 Kalimantan,	
South	 Sulawesi	 and	 Papua.	 We	 met	 during	
training	forums,	workshops	and	seminars	and	
communicated	 via	 email.	 This	 interaction	
was	very	constructive	and	provided	plenty	of	
valuable	input	to	the	West	Kalimantan	team.
A	 literature	 review	 complemented	 data	
collected	from	participatory	research,	in-depth	
interviews	 and	 interactions	 with	 teams	 from	
other	provinces.	Secondary	data	was	collected	
from	 newspapers,	 government	 reports	 and	
publications,	 research	 journals,	 village	 and	
subdistrict	 statistics,	 monographs	 and	 maps.	
The	 use	 of	 secondary	 data	 for	 this	 research	
was	based	on	at	least	three	considerations:	it	is	
more affordable because it is sufficient to visit 
libraries	 or	 institutions	 and	 take	 notes	 from	
existing	data;	it	is	quicker	because	the	data	is	
already	available	and	requires	only	sorting	and	
selecting;	 and	 it	would	 be	 impossible	 for	 the	
limited	number	of	researchers	to	collect	all	the	
data	themselves	(Marzuki	1997:	p56).
We	 conducted	 a	 stakeholder	 analysis	 to	
identify	all	parties	involved	in	the	formulation	
and	 implementation	 of	 HPHH	 policies.	 This	
also	gave	us	a	better	understanding	of	the	roles,	
interests	 and	 power	 dynamics	 of	 the	 diverse	
parties and benefits they had received from 
the	new	small-scale	concessions.	This	analysis	
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Figure 1.  Research locations 
was	 conducted	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 study	
and refined through ongoing discussions with 
various	 parties	 during	 group	 discussion	 and	
individual	interviews.	
1.5 Research locations
Research	 was	 conducted	 in	 Melawi,	 a	 sub-
district	established	as	separate	district	of	Sintang	
District2 (see Figure 1). As in its first three years 
of	 existence	Melawi	 District	 remained	 under	
Sintang	 District	 for	 administrative	 purposes,	
while	the	structures	and	infrastructure	required	
for	 it	 to	become	an	 independent	district	were	
prepared,	most	of	the	data	regarding	the	forestry	
and	 land	 uses	 presented	 in	 this	 report	 refer	
to	 the	 former	 Sintang	 District.	 The	 analysis,	
however,	is	based	mostly	on	the	local	situation	
and	stakeholders	in	Melawi.		
Of	 the	 10	 districts	 in	 West	 Kalimantan,	
Sintang	 District	 is	 the	 third	 largest	 after	
Ketapang	and	Kapuas	Hulu.	Two	large	rivers,	
the Kapuas and the Melawi, flow through the 
district.	 The	 rivers	 in	 Sintang	 District	 act	 as	
arteries for community economies, reflected in 
the	concentration	of	settlements	along	the	main	
riverbanks.	Administratively,	 Sintang	 District	
shares	 its	borders	with	Sarawak,	Malaysia,	 to	
the	north,	Central	Kalimantan	Province	to	the	
south,	 Kapuas	 Hulu	 District	 to	 the	 east	 and	
Sanggau	 and	 Ketapang	 Districts	 to	 the	 west.	
Forest	areas	in	Sintang	District	cover	2	million	
ha,	as	illustrated	in	Table	1.
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Ketapang District
Nanga Tebidah
Nanga Pinoh
Menukung
Nanga Sayan
Nanga Sokan
Pemuar
Nanga Dedai
Nanga Serawai
Nanga Ella
MELAWI DISTRICT
MENUKUNG SUBDISTRICT
TEMPUNAK SUBDISTRICT
BELIMBING SUBDISTRICT
ELLA HILIR SUBDISTRICT
SAYAN SUBDISTRICT
TANAH PINOH SUBDISTRICT
SOKAN SUBDISTRICT
Kota Baru
DEDAI SUBDISTRICT
KAYAN HILIR SUBDISTRICT
KAYAN HULU SUBDISTRICT
SEPAUK SUBDISTRICT
Uko River
SUNGAI TABELAN SUBDISTRICT
NANGA PINOH SUBDISTRICT
Provincial boundary
Subdistrict boundary
Research Location
Kilometer 10 200
Source: Basic map of Sintang District, 1993
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Table 1.  Forest areas in Sintang District showing status and function 
No. Forest region Forested area (ha) Unforested 
(ha)
Cloud-
covered 
(ha)
Total (ha)
Primary Secondary
1 National Park 94 516 20 774 960 - 116 250
2 Recreation park 1 950
3 Conservation Forest 319 316 166 494 121 849 71 966 679 625
4 Limited production 
forest
252 894 308 374 445 962 - 1 007 230
5 Production forest 7 571 49 319 247 439 140 394 376 295
6 Conversion forest - 3 845 - - 3 845
Total 674 297 548 806 816 210 212 360 2185 195
Source: Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi Kalimantan Barat (2000)
The	villages	 of	Nanga	Sayan	 and	Mekar	
Pelita	in	Sayan	Subdistrict	were	selected	as	the	
case	study	locations;	these	both	have	new	100-
ha	HPHH	concessions.	Administratively,	Sayan	
Subdistrict	borders	Nanga	Pinoh	Subdistrict	to	
the	north,	Tanah	Pinoh	Subdistrict	to	the	south,	
Central	 Kalimantan	 Province	 to	 the	 east	 and	
Belimbing	Subdistrict	to	the	west.
The	 population	 of	 Sayan	 Subdistrict	 is	
approximately	14	000.	There	are	2900	people	
living	 in	 Nanga	 Sayan	 and	 2600	 in	 Mekar	
Pelita.	 Communities	 earn	 their	 livelihoods	
from	shifting	cultivation,	tapping	latex,	keeping	
livestock,	felling	timber3,	mining	and	washing	
gold.	 During	 the	 dry	 season,	 gold	 mining	 is	
the	main	source	of	income	for	the	majority	of	
communities,	 as	 mining	 locations	 are	 close	
to	 rivers.	 Men	 commonly	 mine	 while	 older	
villagers	 and	 women	 wash	 the	 gold.	 During	
the	rainy	season,	some	villagers	turn	to	timber	
felling	 for	 their	 income,	as	 trees	are	easier	 to	
fell, float and transport at this time. Villagers 
prepare	land	for	cultivation	during	the	transition	
from	the	dry	to	the	rainy	season,	which	can	be	
at	any	time	between	June	and	September.
Since	the	introduction	of	the	HPH	system	
at	 the	end	of	 the	1960s,	17	HPH	concessions	
have	 been	 in	 operation	 in	 Sintang	 District,	
covering	a	total	area	of	almost	1.6	million	ha	
(see	Table	2).
6FORESTRY SECTOR POLICY IN SINTANG DISTRICT 
BEFORE AND AFTER DECENTRALIZATION2
2.1 Forestry sector policy 
before decentralization
Following	the	fall	of	President	Soekarno’s	Old	
Order	 regime	 in	 1967,	 a	 new	 regime	 came	 to	
power	 in	 Indonesia.	 Under	 the	 command	 of	
President	Soeharto,	the	New	Order	government	
implemented	 a	 highly	 centralized	 system	 of	
governance	 areas	 across	 all	 sectors,	 including	
the	forestry	sector.	As	in	the	rest	of	Indonesia,	
forestry	in	Sintang	was	managed	by	the	central	
administration	in	Jakarta.
Forest	 resources	 were	 managed	 in	
accordance	 with	 Law	 No.	 5/1967	 on	 Basic	
Forestry	 Provisions.	 In	 the	 same	 year	 Law	
No.	 1/1967	 on	Foreign	 Investment	 opened	 up	
opportunities	for	foreign	investors	in	Indonesia.	
The	forestry	sector	provided	them	with	lucrative	
business	opportunities.	The	end	of	the	1960s	saw	
the	 introduction	 of	 a	 new	 forest	 management	
system:	the	Indonesian	Selective	Felling	system	
(Tebang Pilih Indonesia	or	TPI)	(see	Armitage	
and	Kuswanda,	1989).
TPI	 was	 implemented	 by	 granting	 rights	
or	concessions	to	large	state-owned	enterprises	
(Badan Usaha Milik Negara	 or	 BUMN)	 or	
privately-owned	companies	(Badan Usaha Milik 
Swasta	or	BUMS).	This	system	is	better	known	
as	Hak Pengusahaan Hutan	(HPH).	HPHs	were	
controlled	 by	 the	 central	 government	 and	 all	
fees	 from	 timber	 were	 channelled	 to	 Jakarta.	
Provisions	 for	 the	 implementation	of	HPHs	 in	
Indonesia	are	laid	out	in	Government	Regulation	
No.	21/1970	on	Forest	Concessions	and	Forest	
Product	 Extraction	 Rights,	 Government	
Regulation	No.	22/1970	on	Forest	Concession	
Levies,	 and	 Government	 Regulation	 No.	
33/1970	on	Forest	Planning.	These	regulations	
gave	 the	 Department	 of	 Forestry	 authority	 to	
grant	 35-year	 HPH	 concessions	 by	 issuing	
decrees	to	state	and	private	enterprises.	
With	their	permits	from	the	Department	of	
Forestry,	HPH	concessionaires	began	operating	
on	the	four	large	islands	of	Sumatra,	Kalimantan,	
Sulawesi	 and	Papua.	Concessions	 granted	 by	
the	Department	of	Forestry	commonly	covered	
100	000	ha,	but	these	concessions	were	often	as	
large	as	or	sometimes	even	larger	than	1	million	
ha.	By	1990	 there	were	more	 than	500	 large-
scale	 HPH	 concessions	 in	 operation	 across	
Indonesia.	 In	 Sintang	 District	 the	 number	 of	
once-active	 HPH	 concessions	 is	 recorded	 at	
17,	covering	a	total	area	of	almost	1.6	million	
ha	(Table	2).	
In	 Sintang,	 some	 HPH	 concessions	 are	
now	 inactive	 because	 their	 licences	 have	
expired	and	are	no	longer	legally	valid.	Some	
HPH	 concessions	 are	 inactive	 despite	 their	
licences	 still	 being	 valid,	 as	 they	 have	 not	
obtained	approval	from	the	provincial	forestry	
office. While the Ministry of Forestry has the 
right	 to	 approve	 HPH	 concessionaires’	 long-
term	and	5-year	plans,	 the	provincial	 forestry	
office plays a major role in checking the 
validity	of	applications	for	work	plans,	giving	
advice	to	the	Minister	and	approving	the	HPH	
concessionaires’	annual	plans.	
‘Status	 unclear’	means	HPH	 concessions	
with	 legally	 valid	 licences	 and	 authorized	
felling targets from the Forestry Office have 
chosen	not	to	operate	due	to	social	problems	in	
the field, such as conflicts with local villagers.
Prior	to	decentralization	HPH	concessions	
made	 a	 large	 contribution	 to	 the	 national	
treasury,	 as	 all	 fees	 and	 charges	 from	 timber	
production	 were	 transferred	 to	 the	 central	
government.	Table	3	provides	a	partial	picture	of	
Sintang	District’s	forestry	sector	contributions	
to	state	revenue	prior	to	2001.
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No Name of Company Area (ha) Location Licence 
(years)
Status in 2004
1 PT. Sari Bumi Kusuma 66 000 Ng. Serawai 1986-2006 Status unclear
2 PT. Kalimantan Satya 
Kencana
48 000 Sayan 1999-2019 Active
3 PT. Delapan – Delapan 120 000 Ng. Pinoh 1976-1996 Expired
4 PT. Tunas Indo Timber 91 000 Ng. Pinoh 1979-1999 Revoked
5 PT. Kurnia Kapuas 
Plywood
75 000 Ng. Ella 1987-2007 Status unclear 
6 PT. Kartika Kapuas Sari 60 000 Ng. Ambalau 1985-2005 Status unclear
7 PT. Rimba Adijaya 
Nusantara
71 600 Ng. Ambalau 1978-1998 Expired
8 PT. Saritama Indah Raya 50 000 Ng. Tebidah 1990-2010 Inactive
9 PT. Jamaker/Perum 
Perhutani
220 000 Ketungau 1976-1999 Permit revoked 
in 1999
10 PT. Barito Pasifik Timber 176 000 Ng. Sepauk 1976-1996 Expired
11 PT. Kayu Lapis Indonesia 177 000 Ng. Sepauk 1979-1999 Expired
12 PT. Halisa 100 000 Ng. Sepauk 1981-2001 Expired
13 PT. Bulind 60 000 Ng. Pinoh 1993-2013 Permit revoked 
in 1996
14 PT. Kusuma Atlas Timber 45 300 Ng. Pinoh 1992-2012 Inactive
15 PT. Rimba Agung Utama 40 000 Sintang 1988-2008 Inactive
16 PT. Wanasokan Hasilindo 49 000 Sokan 2001-2021 Active
17 PT. Batasan 143 000 Ketungau 1980-2000 Expired
Total 1 591 900
Table 2. HPH concessions in Sintang District 
Source: Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi Kalimantan Barat (2003a)
Year Timber production
(m³)
PSDH* 
(Rp. billion)
DR Reforestation Fund
US$ (million) Rp. (billion)
1997 358 529.73 19.01 5.13 36.26
1998 279 222.61 14.69 2.52 31.88
1999 47 799.07 2.12 0.15 4.56
2000 33 920.05 0.38 0.10 0.84
Table 3. Sintang District forestry sector contributions to the government 
*Forest Resource Rent Provision, a tax paid on the timber felled, henceforth referred to as the PSDH timber tax 
 Source: Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Kabupaten Sintang (2004a) 
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It	 seems	 that	 the	 political	 changes	 that	
occurred	after	 the	 fall	of	Soeharto	gave	more	
opportunities	for	economic	prosperity	for	local	
people.	Timber	production	decreased	between	
1998	 and	 2000,	 indicating	 that	 the	 central	
government	 lost	 some	 control	 over	 forest	
resource	 revenue	 extraction.	 Records	 suggest	
that	the	reduction	in	government	revenue	from	
timber	harvesting	did	not	mean	a	decrease	 in	
actual	timber	production,	rather	it	indicates	an	
increase	 of	 ‘underground’	 timber	 extraction,	
otherwise	 known	 as	 illegal	 logging.	 This	
may	explain	why	 recorded	 timber	production	
suddenly	decreased	from	1999	onwards.
With	 the	 HPH	 system	 under	 full	 central	
government	control	during	the	New	Order	era,	
regional	 governments	 and	 local	 communities	
played	almost	no	part	at	all	in	forest	resource	
management.	 Despite	 its	 status	 as	 a	 large	
contributing	 region,	 Sintang	 District	 did	 not	
enjoy	 any	material	 reward	 from	 the	 timber	 it	
produced.	In	accordance	with	Law	No.	5/1967,	
local	 communities	 were	 permitted	 to	 extract	
only	non-timber	forest	products	for	their	own	
subsistence	 needs.	 Community	 participation	
in	HPH	concession	management	was	minimal	
or	non-existent,	 the	most	accurate	description	
being	‘watching	passively	in	one’s	own	home’	
(hanya menjadi penonton di rumah sendiri).	
HPH	concessionaires	were	obliged	to	empower	
local	communities	through	the	HPH	Bina Desa	
village	 development	 programme.	 In	 practice	
very	little	if	anything	was	achieved	under	this	
scheme.	
In	 ecological	 terms,	 HPHs	 left	 behind	
them	 numerous	 detrimental	 effects	 such	 as	
damaged	 forest	 resources,	 increased	 areas	 of	
critical land, forest fires, and water and air 
pollution.	All	this	impacted	negatively	on	local	
communities.	Data	from	the	West	Kalimantan	
Provincial Forestry Office shows that the 
amount	 of	 degraded	 forest	 land	 in	 Sintang	
District	 forests	 had	 reached	 500	 000	 ha	 by	
1999	 (Dinas	 Kehutanan	 Provinsi	 Kalimantan	
Barat	2003).	
The	Basic	Forestry	Law	5/1967	has	become	
the	reference	point	 for	 two	regulations	 issued	
in	the	run	up	to	the	decentralizaton	era.	These	
regulations	had	the	potential	to	give	the	district	
heads	 greater	 authority	 over	 forest	 resources.	
The first one of these was Government 
Regulation	(PP)	No.	62/19984,	in	which	several	
forestry	 matters,	 although	 unrelated	 to	 forest	
utilization	and	timber	extraction	in	forest	areas,	
were	delegated	to	the	districts.	The	second	was	
Government	 Regulation	 No.	 6/19995,	 which	
granted	 a	 district	 head	 the	 authority	 to	 issue	
forest	 product	 harvesting	 rights.	 Referring	 to	
these	two	laws,	the	Ministry	of	Forestry	issued	
decree	No.	310/1999,	which	provided	detailed	
guidance	 on	 how	 forest	 product	 harvesting	
rights	should	be	granted.
	
2.2 Forestry sector policy 
after decentralization
Decentralization	took	effect	across	the	whole	of	
Indonesia	on	1	January	2001.	However,	at	the	
end	of	the	Soeharto	regime	in	1998, reformasi	
euphoria	 spread	 to	 all	 corners	 of	 Indonesia.	
Many	 circles	 in	 society	 were	 demanding	 an	
end	 to	 the	 centralized	 system	 of	 governance.	
During	 1998	 regional	 governments	 asked	
for	 a	 greater	 role	 in	 administering	 their	 own	
affairs.	They	also	demanded	a	greater	share	of	
profits from natural resource exploitation; this 
included	forests	in	their	areas.	At	the	same	time	
local	 communities	 began	 making	 land-rights	
claims	 and	 demanding	 compensation	 from	
timber	 companies	 for	 the	 damage	 and	 losses	
caused	 by	 their	 operations	 (McCarthy,	 2004:	
p1202).
Although decentralization was officially 
introduced	 under	 Laws	 No.	 22/1999	 and	
No.	 25/1999,	 it	 only	 began	 in	 earnest	 at	 the	
beginning	of	2001	because	of	the	time	required	
to	 prepare	 for	 implementation	 at	 the	 national	
and	regional	levels,	namely	the	legal	aspects	of	
implementation	and	the	process	of	transferring	
administrative	and	regulatory	authority	from	the	
central	to	regional	governments.	Consequently,	
the	period	between	1998	and	the	end	of	2000	is	
often	considered	a	transition	period.
During	 the	 transition	period	 stakeholders	
had	 different	 interpretations	 of	 how	 to	
implement	 autonomous	 management	 of	
forest	 resources.	 There	 were	 no	 laws	 clearly	
regulating	 forest	 resource	management	 in	 the	
provinces	and	districts;	Laws	No.	22	and	No.	
25	 were	 only	 umbrellas	 for	 implementing	
decentralization.	 In	 1999	 a	 new	 forestry	 law	
was	 promulgated	 in	 Law	 No.	 41/19996,	 but	
its	 three	 provisions	 were	 still	 very	 general,	
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leaving	 many	 of	 what	 McCarthy	 (2004)	 has	
termed	‘gray	areas’	in	legal	implementation	and	
division	of	responsibilities.	Lower	rulings	such	
as	government	regulations,	ministerial	decrees	
and	regional	directives	(Perda)	were	expected	
to	clarify	these	ambiguities.	The	result	of	this	
legal	vacuum	was	regular	disagreement	among	
stakeholders	 as	 to	 who	 had	 what	 authority,	
and	who	was	 responsible	 for	matters	 such	 as	
determining	 forest	 areas,	 utilization	 of	 forest	
products,	 issuing	 permits	 for	 their	 forest	
product	extraction,	and	collecting	taxes	or	fees.	
In	spite	of	these	ambiguities	and	the	weak	legal	
foundations	 for	 forest	 management,	 decision	
makers	took	their	own	steps.	This	is	what	Rhee	
(2000)	labelled	‘de	facto	decentralization’.
In	West	Kalimantan	this	air	of	uncertainty	
saw	 an	 increase	 in	 illegal	 logging.	The	West	
Kalimantan	Illegal	Logging	Investigation	Team	
noted	that	illegal	timber	from	Putussibau	may	
use	any	one	of	10	different	routes	on	its	way	to	
Kumpai	or	Kuala	Dua,	Pontianak,	while	timber	
from	 Nanga	 Pinoh	 and	 Sintang	 may	 travel	
along	 8	 different	 routes.	 Illegal	 timber	 from	
Sintang	is	moved	along	2	or	3	different	routes	
on	the	way	to	Entikong	and	the	same	goes	for	
timber	from	Badau.	Investors	and	brokers	play	
a	large	part	in	illegal	logging	activities,	making	
use	of	communities	to	whom	they	pay	only	Rp.	
4000	per	tree.
Decentralization	 compels	 regional	
governments	 to	 fund	 their	 own	 planning	 and	
development	 programmes	 independently.	
Therefore they have had to find ways to 
increase	 their	 own-source	 revenues	 (PAD).	
Forests	 resources	 have	 become	 one	 of	 the	
most	 important	 sources	 of	 PAD	 in	 many	
regions,	including	West	Kalimantan.	The	race	
to	 increase	 PAD	 during	 the	 transition	 period	
was	 often	 driven	 by	 short-term	 economic	
interests.	 Conservation	 efforts	 and	 local	
social	or	economic	development	opportunities	
were	 neglected.	 The	 only	 way	 that	 district	
governments	could	raise	independent	revenue	
from	the	forestry	sector	was	by	exercising	their	
authority	 to	 issue	100-ha	HPHH	concessions.	
The	 revenues	 from	 larger	 HPH	 concessions	
still flow to Jakarta for redistribution amongst 
the	districts	in	their	province	of	origin.
In	 practice,	 under	 decentralization	
forest	 resource	 management	 has	 become	
more	 complex,	 and	 involves	 many	 more	
practitioners.	 Prior	 to	 decentralization,	 only	
large timber firms (HPHs) were licensed to sell 
timber.	Following	decentralization,	the	original	
players	 are	 still	 around,	 but	 they	 have	 been	
joined	 by	 new	 actors,	 among	 them	brokers	 –	
some	from	overseas	–	who	openly	make	use	of	
local	communities	living	in	or	around	forests,	
or	outsiders	who	have	access	to	forest	resources	
managed	under	the	HPHH	system.
The	Sintang	District	Government	drafted	
its	own	forest	resource	management	regulations	
to	 control	 the	 issuance	 of	 small-scale	 Forest	
Timber	Product	Utilization	Permits	(Izin Usaha 
Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu	 (IUPHHK)	
covering	 50	 000-ha	 areas	 and	Forest	 Product	
Harvest	Concessions	(Hak Pemungutan Hasil 
Hutan	(HPHH)	for	100-ha	areas.	The	Sintang	
District	 Head	 issued	 eight	 IUPHHK	 permits,	
covering	an	area	of	just	over	220	000	ha	(see	
Table	4).	
The	 100-ha	 HPHH	 permits	 were	 based	
on	 Ministerial	 Decree	 No.	 310/Kpts-II/1999,	
No Name of Company Area (ha) Location Validity
1 PT. Borneo Karunia Mandiri 12 000 Kayan Hulu 2003-2028
2 PT. Sinergi Bumi Lestari 16 900 Sokan 2001-2026
3 PT. Safir Kencana Raharja 36 400 Ng. Serawai 2001-2026
4 PT. Lintas Ketungau Jaya 50 000 Ketungau Hulu 2003-2028
5 Koperasi Apang Semangai 16 500 Kayan Hulu 2002-2027
6 PT. Rimba Kapuas Lestari 41 090 Sepauk 2002-2027
7 PT. Insan Kapuas 34 000 Ng. Ambalau 2002-2027
8 PT. Hutan Persada Lestari 13 500 Ng. Ambalau 2002-2027
Total 220 390
Source: Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Kabupaten Sintang (2004b)
Table 4. IUPHHK permits issued by the Sintang District Head 
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Year Permits Issued Operational
Number Area (ha) Number Area (ha)
2000 110 11 000 3 300
2001 320 32 000 88 8 800
2002 159 15 900 77 7 700
2003 13 1 300 154 15 400
Total 602 60,200 322 32 000
Table 5. 100-ha HPHHs in Sintang District
Source: Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Kabupaten Sintang (2004a) 
which	 gave	 regional	 governments	 (district	
heads	and	mayors)	the	administrative	authority	
to	 issue	 100-ha	 HPHHs,	 and	 No.05.1/Kpts-
II/2000	 on	 Criteria	 and	 Standards	 for	 Forest	
Utilization	 Permits	 and	 Timber	 Extraction	
Permits	in	Natural	Production	Forests.	District	
governments	in	West	Kalimantan	followed	up	
on	this	decree	by	issuing	a	number	of	decrees	
and	directives	of	their	own:
1.	 The	Sanggau	District	Head	issued	Regional	
Directive	No.	15/2000
2.	 The	 Sintang	District	Head	 issued	Decree	
No.	19/1999
3.	 The	 Kapuas	 Hulu	 District	 Head	 issued	
Decree	No.	2/2000
4.	 The	 Bengkayang	 District	 Government	
issued	Regional	Directive	No.	1/2000,	and
5.	 The	Ketapang	District	Government	issued	
Decree	No.	29/2001
Between	 2000	 and	 2003,	 the	 Sintang	
District	 Government	 granted	 permits	 to	 602	
of	 the	 1338	 HPHH	 applicants	 (see	 Table	 5	
above).	 Permits	 were	 valid	 for	 one	 year,	 but	
expired	permits	were	generally	recommended	
for	extension	 if	 their	100-ha	HPHH	locations	
had	 not	 been	 fully	 exploited.	 The	 remaining	
736	 applications	 were	 denied	 for	 a	 number	
of reasons, usually for failing to fulfil all the 
necessary	 administrative	 requirements.	 It	 is	
interesting	 to	 note	 that	 of	 the	 areas	 allocated	
100-ha	HPHH	permits,	 in	 only	 50%	of	 them	
were	 any	 trees	 actually	 felled.	 Some	 had	
permits	but	no	working	partners;	others	were	
in	 locations	with	gradients	of	more	 than	30°,	
making	them	inaccessible	to	heavy	equipment.	
Others	 were	 obstructed	 by	 ongoing	 internal	
and external social conflicts.
The	 100-ha	 HPHHs	 offered	 the	 district	
government	 its	 only	 opportunity	 to	 raise	
independent	 revenue.	 They	 gave,	 on	 paper	
at	 least,	 local	 communities	 an	 opportunity	 to	
benefit from timber extraction for the first time. 
It	is	therefore	not	surprising	that	100-ha	HPHHs	
were	 the	most	prominent	 issue	 in	discussions	
on	 forest	management	 under	 decentralization	
in	 Sintang.	 The	 same	 is	 true	 in	 most	 other	
provinces	 in	Kalimantan	 (see	e.g.,	Barr	et al.	
2001;	Casson	2001;	McCarthy	2001a,	b,	2004,	
etc.).	Accordingly	we	discuss	the	100-ha	HPHH	
issue	in	more	depth	in	Section	3.
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THE CASE OF 100-HA HPHHs IN SINTANG DISTRICT3
Table 6. 100-ha HPHHs issued in West 
Kalimantan 2000–2002 (Budiarto et al. 2003)
District/Year 2000 2001 2002 Total
Kapuas Hulu 11 165 159 335
Sintang 102 176 186 464
Sanggau 1 7 12 20
Sambas 4 13 7 24
Bengkayang 0 4 9 13
Landak 0 1 1 2
Pontianak 12 32 31 75
Ketapang 1 1 9 11
Total 131 399 414 944
3.1  The introduction of small-
scale community-based 
100-ha HPHH permits
The	objectives	behind	 the	ministerial	 decrees	
governing	 100-ha	HPHHs	were	 ostensibly	 to	
ensure	that	forest	resource	management	could	
provide direct benefits to communities living 
in	and	around	forests.	These	decrees	regulated	
procedures	 for	 harvesting	 timber	 in	 line	with	
the	 capacity	 of	 the	 local	 communities.	 For	
example,	they	stipulated	a	relatively	small	area	
of	forest	land,	and	prohibited	the	use	of	heavy	
machinery.	
Regional governments justified their 
issuance	of	100-ha	HPHH	permits	as	a	means	
of	 increasing	 the	 districts’	 locally	 generated	
revenue	(PAD)	–	a	reasonable	argument	in	light	
of the fact that the districts now had to find their 
own	 development	 funds.	 The	 need	 for	 PAD	
drove	a	proliferation	of	100-ha	HPHHs	across	
West	Kalimantan.	Another	common	argument	
was	that	the	time	had	come	for	local	people	to	
enjoy profits from their own forests. Previously, 
profits from forest exploitation were reserved 
for	 those	 who	 enjoyed	 Soeharto’s	 favour,	
namely	 large	 companies	 owned	 by	 members	
of	 the	government	and	the	military,	and	large	
business	conglomerates	based	in	Jakarta.
From	2000	to	2002,	a	total	of	944	100-ha	
HPHHs	 were	 issued	 by	 district	 governments	
in	West	Kalimantan.	The	highest	number	was	
issued	 in	 Sintang	District	 (464),	 followed	 by	
Kapuas	 Hulu	 District	 (335).	 Table	 6	 shows	
the	number	of	100-ha	HPHHs	 issued	 in	West	
Kalimantan	Province.
The	 Sintang	 District	 Government	 issued	
a	District	Head’s	Decree,	No.	19/1999,	laying	
down	 provisions	 for	 issuing	 100-ha	 HPHH	
permits.	The	District	Secretary	 issued	several	
circulars	 explaining	 fees	 for	 100-ha	 HPHHs.	
There	were	several	fundamental	provisions	in	
the	District	Head’s	decree:	trees	could	be	felled	
in	 conversion	 forests	 or	 production	 forests	
allocated	 for	 conversion,	 in	 areas	 designated	
for	 cultivation	 according	 to	 the	 Provincial	
Spatial	Plan	(RTRWP)	and	the	Consensus	for	
Forest	 Land	 Use	 Plan	 (TGHK),	 in	 dryland	
agricultural	 areas	 and	 privately-owned	
forests	 (District	Head’s	Decree,	No.	19/1999,	
Section	 II,	 Article	 2,	 paragraph	 1).	 There	
was	 also	 a	 provision	 for	 extraction	 of	 non-
timber	 forest	 products	 in	 conversion	 forests,	
production	 forests,	 conservation	 forests	 and	
privately	 owned	 forests	 (Section	 II,	 Article	
1,	 paragraph	 2).	 HPHHs	 could	 be	 issued	 to	
individuals,	 farmer	 groups	 and	 cooperatives	
in	and	around	those	forest	areas.	Other	matters	
such as conditions for fulfilling administrative 
requirements,	 evaluation	 methods	 etc.	 were	
also	covered	by	the	decree.	
If	an	HPHH	application	was	approved,	the	
District	Head	issued	a	Forest	Product	Harvest	
Concession	Allocation	 Letter.	 This	was	 valid	
12
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Figure 2. The 100-ha HPHH application process
for	 three	months	 but	 could	 be	 extended.	The	
applicant	was	then	obliged	to	map	the	borders	
of	the	area	to	be	felled,	survey	timber	potential,	
identify	any	third-party	rights	over	the	allocated	
area,	 and	 pay	 HPHH	 fees.	 The	 boundary	
survey and identification of third-party rights 
were	 to	be	undertaken	by	 the	Sintang	District	
Forestry Office or Forest Management Unit 
(Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan	(see	Section	IV,	
Article 8, paragraph 1). A Forestry Office report 
of	 investigation	outcomes	would	 then	be	used	
to	make	an	HPHH	work	plan.	This	work	plan	
was	to	be	submitted	to	the	Sintang	District	Head	
within	 one	 month	 of	 the	 date	 of	 issue	 of	 the	
HPHH	Allocation	Letter	(Section	IV,	Article	9).	
If	an	HPHH	work	plan	was	not	submitted	
by	 the	 deadline,	 the	 Sintang	 District	 Head	
could	unilaterally	revoke	the	HPHH	Allocation	
Letter	 (Section	 IV,	 Article	 9,	 paragraph	 2).	
HPHH	work	plans	were	to	be	evaluated	by	the	
local Forestry Office within 14 working days 
of	receipt	(Section	IV,	Article	10).	The	District	
Head	then	issued	either	an	HPHH	permit	or	a	
letter	 of	 rejection	 depending	 on	 whether	 the	
application	 had	 been	 approved	 or	 refused.	
(Section	 IV,	Article	 11,	 paragraphs	 1	 and	 2).	
The	HPHH	application	process	can	be	seen	in	
full	in	Figure	2.
According	 to	 the	District	 Head’s	 decree,	
the	 primary	 aim	 for	 issuing	 HPHHs	 was	 to	
provide	 better	 livelihoods	 for	 forest-dwelling	
communities	 by	 involving	 them	 in	 forest	
resource	management.	Did	the	policy	achieve	
this?	 The	 following	 sections	 consider	 this	
question	in	detail.
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3.2 Decree No. 19/1999 – 
implementation and 
irregularities
Our research in the field uncovered several 
practices	which	 deviated	 from	 the	 provisions	
in	Decree	No.	19/1999.	Several	HPHH	permits	
were	granted	for	areas	inside	production	forests	
already	 covered	 by	HPH	 timber	 concessions;	
this	 was	 the	 case	 with	 Kalimantan	 Satya	
Kencana	 (KSK),	 an	 HPH	 timber	 company’s	
area.	 This	 company	 was	 asked	 to	 work	 as	 a	
HPHH	partner	by	the	farmer	group.	As	a	result,	
the	company	did	not	have	to	exploit	the	forest	
in	accordance	with	its	approved	RKT	(Annual	
Production	Plan).	Operating	instead	in	100-ha	
HPHH	blocks	meant	 that	 the	 company	 could	
fell	 more	 logs	 than	 were	 allowed	 under	 its	
large-scale	HPH	permit.	
Applicants	 also	 cut	 corners	 on	 the	 work	
plan	 for	 HPHHs.	 Boundary	 plans,	 timber	
potential and area identification surveys were 
not	 carried	 out	 properly:	 they	 were	 paper	
exercises.	 This	 resulted	 further	 in	 overlaps	
between	 HPHH	 and	 HPH	 concessions	 (this	
time	with	separate	permit	holders	laying	claim	
to	 the	 same	 area).	 It	 also	meant	 that	HPHHs	
were	 granted	 inside	 conservation	 forests,	
and	 in	 areas	 that	 were	 impossible	 to	 exploit	
due	 to	 their	steep	gradients.	This	 led	 to	 inter-
community conflicts like the clashes between 
villagers	 from	 Nanga	 Sayan	 with	 villagers	
from	Mekar	Pelita	and	Madya	Raya.
The	 Sintang	 District	 regulation	 followed	
the	national	stipulation	that	no	heavy	equipment	
could	 be	 used	 to	 exploit	 HPHH	 areas.	 Use	
of	 mechanical	 equipment	 was	 expressly	
prohibited.	 However,	 heavy	 equipment	 such	
as	chainsaws,	tractors	and	logging	trucks	was	
almost	always	used.	This	was	because	HPHH	
locations	 were	 usually	 contracted	 to	 large	
companies	who	had	heavy	duty	equipment	and	
experience	of	high-capacity	felling.	Examples	
included	 100-ha	 HPHH	 permit	 holders	 who	
were	working	in	partnership	with	large	timber	
firms such as PT. Erna Djuliawati, PT. Karya 
Bersama	Jaya,	etc.	
The	district	regulation	also	stipulated	that	
permit	holders	should	replant	logged	over	areas.	
Almost	 no	 100-ha	 HPHH	 owners	 replanted	
trees	 in	 their	 areas.	Finally,	 funds	originating	
from	PSDH	(Forest	Resource	Rent	Provision,	
or	 timber	 tax)	 or	 DR	 (Reforestation	 Funds)	
paid	by	HPHH	holders	were	not	deposited	 in	
the	Minister	of	Forestry’s	account;	instead	they	
were	held	by	the	Sintang	District	Government	
Treasury.	
With	the	revocation	of	Ministerial	Decree	
No.	 05.1/Kpts-II/2000	 and	 its	 replacement	
by	 Ministerial	 Decree	 No.	 541/Kpts-II/2002,	
the	 Sintang	 District	 Government	 should	 no	
longer	 have	 had	 the	 administrative	 authority	
to	 issue	 HPHH	 permits	 after	 1	March	 2002.	
Nonetheless	it	continued	to	do	so	well	beyond	
that	 date,	 and	 in	 2003	 even	 went	 as	 far	 as	
extending	HPHH	permits	for	unexploited	areas	
by providing certificates of legitimacy for 
forest	products	(SKSHH)	based	on	applicants’	
forest	 production	 reports	 (LHP).	 These	
certificates are needed before a company can 
sell	 its	 timber.	This	effectively	meant	that	 the	
district	 government	 legitimized	 logs	 for	 sale,	
even	if	they	were	from	areas	not	covered	by	the	
original	permit.	
According	 to	 the	 Sintang	 District	 Head,	
the	 revocation	 of	 the	 Ministerial	 Decree	
contravened	 the	 decentralization	 laws	
and	 failed	 to	 support	 the	 interests	 of	 local	
forest	 communities.	 He	 often	 dismissed	 the	
ministerial	decree	by	arguing	that	the	People’s	
Consultative	Assembly’s	Decree	No.	 III/2000	
stated	 that	 ministerial	 decrees	 were	 below	
district	regulations	in	the	legal	hierarchy.	The	
District	Head’s	argument	was	reinforced	when	
the	Minister	of	Home	Affairs	issued	Decree	No.	
130-67/2002	on	the	administrative	authority	of	
central,	provincial	and	district	governments	in	
the	 forestry	 sector,	 which	 stated	 that	 district	
governments	 held	 administrative	 authority	
over	forest	management.	In	the	meantime,	the	
Ministry	of	Forestry	continued	to	assert	that	it	
had	the	highest	legal	authority	over	the	forestry	
sector.	
In	 this	 context,	 the	 Sintang	 District	
Government’s	 apparent	 non-compliance	 with	
forestry	sector	policy	comes	down	to	different	
perceptions	 about	 which	 national	 policies	
should	 be	 followed:	 Department	 of	 Forestry	
policies	or	decentralization	laws	and	policies.
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4 CASE STUDY: SMALL-SCALE COMMUNITY-BASED 100-HA HPHH PERMITS IN SAYAN SUBDISTRICT
4.1  Forest regions and 
forestry activities before 
and after decentralization
Village	forests	in	Sayan	Subdistrict	are	divided	
into	 the	 following	 three	 categories7.	 These	
categories	of	tenure	are	recognized	and	upheld	
by local communities, but they are not officially 
recognized	by	the	state.	
1. Ulayat	forests8,	often	referred	to	as	village	
or	 community	 forests,	 are	 communal	
forest	 areas	 covering	whole	 village	 areas	
including	protected	areas.	These	forests	are	
recognized	 as	 being	 collectively	 owned,	
and	 this	 ownership	 extends	 to	 the	 land	
itself.
2.	 Customary	forests	are	forest	areas	in	which	
villagers	 have	 rights	 over	 the	 possession,	
management	 and	 inheritance	 of	 certain	
trees.	 Ownership	 does	 not	 extend	 to	 the	
land	itself.	Ownership	is	based	on	selecting,	
marking,	 planting	 and	 maintaining	 trees	
and	is	generally	well	established	amongst	
the	 villagers.	 This	 type	 of	 ownership	
is	 most	 commonly	 damar	 tebok9,	 i.e.,	
recognition	 of	 ownership	 rights	 to	 resin-
producing	 trees	 such	 as	 ‘majak’	 (Shorea 
palembanica),	 ‘bangkirai’	 (Shorea 
laevifolia),	 and	 ‘jelutung’	 (Dyera spp).	
Recognition	 of	 customary	 forests	 may	
be confirmed by village elders as local 
community/customary figures. Some 
customary	 forest	 ownership	 rights	 are	
recognized	 in	written	 form	 and	 some	 are	
not10;	 however,	 both	 are	 equally	 binding	
and	 are	 generally	 undisputed	 by	 local	
communities.
3.	 Customary	 protected	 areas	 are	 forest	
regions	 protected	 by	 communities	 and	
villages for use solely to fulfil villagers’ 
subsistence	needs	and	not	for	commercial	
purposes.	Protected	areas	may	be	in	one	or	
more	than	one	location	within	a	community	
forest.	Forest	products	that	may	be	collected	
and	utilized	in	these	areas	include	limited	
amounts	 of	 timber	 for	 villagers’	 own	
requirements,	 non-timber	 forest	 products,	
medicinal	plants,	fruit	and	game.
Sayan	 communities	 are	 familiar	 with	
and	 respect	 this	 customary	 division	 of	 forest	
regions.	 However,	 in	 legal	 terms	 this	 tenure	
system	is	informal	as	ownership	of	these	forest	
regions	 is	 not	 registered	 with	 the	 relevant	
government	 institutions.	 Instead,	 all	 land	
categorized	as	 forest	estate	 (Kawasan Hutan)	
is officially owned by the state, and falls under 
the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	Ministry	of	Forestry	or	
the	district	government,	which	are	authorized	
to	 issue	 permits	 for	 forest	 exploitation.	
Consequently,	 when	 HPHs	 began	 operating	
at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1960s	 Sayan	 customary	
communities	 were	 unilaterally	 marginalized.	
Access	 to	 their	 traditional	 forest	 areas	 was	
restricted	 by	 HPH	 timber	 companies	 who	
argued	 that	 they	 owned	 concessions	 in	 state	
forests.	 Community	 rights	 over tebok	 forest	
were	systematically	 lost	and	 tebok	 trees	were	
felled	 by	 HPH	 concessionaires.	 When	 tebok	
forest	 owners	 made	 any	 claims,	 they	 were	
granted	 damages	 of	 Rp.	 5000	 to	 Rp.	 10	 000	
(around	 US$	 0.50	 to	 US$	 1)	 for	 each	 resin-
producing	 tree	 felled	 in	 the	 concession	 area.	
Timber	 companies	 commonly	paid	 these	 tiny	
compensation fees to avoid conflict or to reduce 
tension and conflict with villagers.
With	 HPH	 timber	 companies	 moving	
into	 customary	 forest	 and	 damar tebok	 in	
Sayan	Subdistrict	 from	 the	 end	of	 the	1960s,	
local	customary	communities	were	able	to	do	
little	 except	 watch	 the	 exploitation	 of	 their	
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homelands.	They	had	little	choice	but	to	submit	
to	the	policies	prevailing	at	the	time.	For	more	
than	 30	 years	 they	 lost	 any	 rights	 over	 their	
ancestral	forests.
With	the	end	of	the	New	Order	regime	and	
the	beginning	of	the	decentralization	era,	new	
hopes	 arose	 among	 customary	 communities.	
They	began	to	reclaim	the	rights	that	the	HPH	
system	had	taken	from	them.	When	the	Sintang	
District	 Head	 introduced	 the	 100-ha	 HPHH	
policy,	 numerous	 community	 groups	 began	
applying	 for	 HPHH	 permits,	 bringing	 with	
them	evidence	of	tebok	forest	ownership.
Tax	receipts	issued	by	the	Dutch	colonial	
administration	were	used	by	tebok	forest	heirs	
to	claim	their	rights	over	customary	forests	and	
the	trees	within	them.	To	reinforce	their	claims,	
tebok	 forest	 heirs	 also	 brought	 witnesses,	
usually	 elders	 of	more	 than	 75	 years	 of	 age,	
to	 state	 that	 they	were	 legitimate	heirs	 to	 the	
tebok	 forests.	 These	 heirs	 then	 made	 written	
statements	 claiming	 their	 ownership	 rights	
over	 the	 tebok	 forest	and	had	them	signed	by	
bordering	 (customary)	 forest	 owners	 or	 other	
tebok	 forest	 rights	holders.	These	 letters	bore	
witness	 to	 the	 applicant’s	 ownership	 rights.	
This	was	accepted	as	evidence	of	ownership	by	
the	 district	 government,	 enabling	 the	 heirs	 to	
submit	their	applications	for	100-ha	HPHHs.
This	 phenomenon	 of	 reclaiming	
customary	 forests	 was	 a	 logical	 consequence	
of	the	political	changes	occurring	in	Indonesia.	
Reformasi	and	decentralization	gave	customary	
communities	 the	 space	 and	platform	 to	make	
claims.	Nevertheless,	in	Sintang	it	has	not	been	
uncommon	 for	 different	 communities	 to	 lay	
claim	to	the	same	areas	of	tebok	forest.	This	has	
led	to	disagreements,	particularly	over	tebok	or	
customary	 forest	 borders.	 One	 such	 example	
occurred	in	Madya	Raya	village,	where	several	
HPHH	 areas	 are	 located	 within	 a	 customary	
protection forest. Another is the conflicting 
tebok	forest	ownership	claims	by	village	KUTs	
(Kelompok Usaha Tani) or farmers’	 business	
groups	 (hereinafter	 referred	 to	 as	 farmer	
groups).	Timber	harvesting	in	 tebok forests	 is	
not	accessible	to	other	communities	without	a	
permit	from	the	owner.	To	protect	tebok	forest,	
owners	who	have	not	applied	for	HPHH	have	
been	asking	for	a	payment	of	Rp.	1000	–	Rp.	
2000	per	cubic	metre	from	permit	holders	who	
have	 been	 granted	 a	 concession	 inside	 their	
tebok	forest.	This	is	a	new	rule	enforced	by	the	
owners	of	tebok forests.	
4.2  Stakeholder roles in small-
scale community-based 
100-ha HPHH permit 
activities
Sintang	District’s	forestry	regulations	state	that	
applications	 for	HPHH	permits	may	be	made	
by	 legally	 constituted	 cooperatives,	 farmer	
groups	 or	 individuals.	 Local	 communities	
would	 commonly	 submit	 HPHH	 applications	
through	 farmer	groups.	This	was	because	 the	
administration	 was	 easier,	 as	 farmer	 groups	
were	 already	 legally	 recognized	 entities.	
Furthermore,	applying	through	a	farmer	group	
meant	 that	 the	 community	 needed	 no	 capital	
outlay,	nor	was	a	formal	licence	required.	This	
was	not	the	case	for	community	cooperatives.	
Several	 farmer	 groups	 would	 also	 merge	 to	
form	 larger	 groups	 chaired	 by	 coordinators,	
who were mostly local figures, such as 
government officials, customary leaders and 
village	leaders.
Usually,	 farmer	 group	 coordinators	
hold	 mandates	 from	 their	 members	 through	
authorization letters tasking them with finding 
working	 partners,	 organizing	 the	 paperwork	
necessary	for	HPHH	applications	and	liaising	
with	 the	 relevant	 government	 institutions.	
Because	 of	 their	 strategic	 role,	 coordinators	
need	 good	 access	 to	 local	 networks.	 They	
also need to be sufficiently knowledgeable 
and	 skilled	 at	 negotiating	 with	 other	 parties.	
Farmer	groups	commonly	worked	with	existing	
timber	companies	(HPHs).	When	HPHHs	were	
declared	 illegal	 by	 the	 central	 government,	
most	timber	companies	broke	off	their	working	
partnerships	with	the	farmer	groups.	As	a	result,	
new	business	 investors	 came	on	board	as	 the	
farmer	groups’	working	partners.
There are a number of official costs 
involved	 in	organizing	permits;	 these	 include	
charges	 for	 permitting,	 stationery,	 maps	
and field surveys. In practice there are also 
numerous unofficial expenses. In addition to 
paying	Rp.	150	000	for	permitting	and	Rp.	500	
000	 for	 stationery	 and	maps,	 a	 farmer	 group	
in	Pekawai	village	paid	out	Rp.	12	million	to	
the	 survey	 team,	while	 another	 farmer	 group	
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in	Nanga	Sayan	village	paid	a	survey	team	Rp.	
17	million.	The	total	cost	of	securing	a	permit	
could	reach	Rp.	20	million.	Variations	in	cost	
depended	on	 the	closeness	of	 the	relationship	
between	the	survey	team	and	the	farmer	group’s	
coordinator	and	chairperson.	The	survey	teams	
were	paid	handsomely	so	that	they	would	not	
obstruct	 but	 help	 accelerate	 the	 application	
process.	 Surveys	 were	 frequently	 poor	 and	
sometimes	 merely	 paper	 exercises,	 with	 no	
surveys	carried	out	on	the	ground	at	all.	
Working	partners	such	as	HPH	companies	
and	 other	 timber	 investors	 were	 central	 to	
activities	because	they	were	the	ones	felling	the	
trees.	The	farmer	groups	only	received	fees	for	
the	felled	timber.	Another	form	of	partnership	
was	 through	 equipment	 rental	 agreements	
with	 existing	 timber	 companies.	This	 scheme	
was more profitable for the farmer group. The 
KUT	 paid	 transportation	 costs	 for	 taking	 the	
equipment	 to	and	 from	 the	site,	while	on-site	
operational	 costs	 and	 labour	 were	 covered	
by	 the	working	 partner.	The	 companies	were	
also	 responsible	 for	 bringing	 equipment	 to	
HPHH	locations.	On	average	the	selling	price	
for	 timber	was	Rp.	500	000	per	 cubic	metre,	
with each party receiving 50% of profits 
following	 full	 payment	 of	 PSDH	 timber	 tax	
and	Reforestation	Fund	charges.
4.3 The economic impact of 
small-scale community-
based 100-ha HPHH 
permits
HPHHs brought economic benefits to the farmer 
groups	and	have	led	to	new	forms	of	economic	
activity	such	as	running	house	shops,	sawmills,	
night	clubs,	hotels	etc.	These	newly	emerging	
business	activities	are	generally	controlled	by	
businessmen	 coming	 in	 from	 the	 province’s	
cities,	 such	 as	 Pontianak	 or	 Sintang.	 Based	
on	calculations	from	HPHHs	in	Nanga	Sayan	
village, the farmer groups made profits of Rp. 
142 million from HPHHs. This profit was 
divided	evenly	between	every	member	of	 the	
KUT.	The	income	received	by	each	member	of	
the	farmer	group	ranged	from	Rp.	1.4	million	
to	Rp.	 2.5	million,	 depending	on	 the	 number	
of	 members.	 Table	 7	 details	 the	 income	 and	
expenses	of	the	farmer	group	in	Nanga	Sayan	
village.
Operational	 costs	 incurred	 by	 working	
partners	 were	 relatively	 high.	 The	 largest	
costs	 were	 timber	 taxes	 (PSDH	 and	 DR),	
followed	by	fees	for	 the	farmer	group	and	its	
coordinator.	 Tax	 is	 around	 Rp.	 200	 000	 per	
cubic	metre,	and	the	farmer	group	fees	are	Rp.	
60	000	cubic	metre.	A	coordinator	receives	Rp.	
15	000	per	cubic	metre.	It	is	also	common	that	
the	coordinator	is	also	a	member	of	the	farmer	
group.	 This	 means	 that	 a	 coordinator	 reaps	
the most profits, as they are paid a fee by the 
working	partner	and	also	receive	a	share	of	the	
profits as a member of the group. 
The	 total	 estimated	 cost	 to	 a	 working	
partner	 is	 between	Rp.	 300	 000	 and	Rp.	 350	
000	per	 cubic	metre.	The	 selling	price	 in	 the	
district	capital	is	Rp.	400	000	per	cubic	metre,	
and	 timber	 can	 fetch	 up	 to	 Rp.	 750	 000	 per	
cubic	metre	in	Pontianak,	the	provincial	capital.	
It	is	also	important	to	note	that	there	are	many	
other	 hidden	 costs	 for	 the	 working	 partner,	
mostly	 incurred	whilst	 transporting	 timber	 to	
Pontianak.	 Local	 timber	 companies	 reported	
Amount (Rp.)
A. Income from working partners’ fees        180 000 000 
B. Expenses:
1. Official cost of administering permits               150 000 
2. Map-making, reporting and administration costs               500 000
3. Costs of potential and border surveys          17 000 000 
4. Block tax before felling (PBB)               960 000 
5. Damages paid to customary forest owners            3 600 000 
6. Coordinator fees          15 000 000 
C. Remainder (A-B) to be divided between members       142 790 000 
Table 7. Farmer group’s income and expenses in Nanga Sayan village
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that	 there	 are	 about	 26	 checkpoints	 between	
Sintang	and	Pontianak	where	they	have	to	pay	
a	fee	for	the	timber	to	pass	through.	
Between	 2000	 and	 2003,	 the	 Sintang	
District	 Government’s	 revenue	 from	 100-ha	
HPHHs	was	generated	 from	 fees	paid	during	
the	 permit	 application	 process	 and	 Land	 and	
Building	 Tax	 (Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan, 
PBB)	 (see	 Table	 8).	 PSDH	 timber	 tax	 and	
Reforestation	 Funds	 should	 have	 been	 paid	
to	central	government;	however,	in	May	2004	
the	 money	 was	 still	 sitting	 in	 the	 Sintang	
District	 Head’s	 bank	 account.	 This	 was	 a	
common	 phenomenon	 across	 the	 province	
of West Kalimantan. District Heads justified 
withholding	 payments	 in	 protest	 at	 the	 funds	
reimbursed	 by	 central	 government.	 They	
argued	these	reimbursed	funds	were	frequently	
late	and	never	as	much	as	they	should	be.
4.4  Increased access brings 
inevitable social conflict 
and disagreements to the 
fore
The	 100-ha	 HPHH	 concessions	 led	 to	
some social conflict and disagreements 
between	 different	 communities,	 and	 between	
communities	 and	 outsiders	 such	 as	 HPH	
companies	 or	 new	 timber	 investors.	At	 least	
three forms of conflict regularly occurred in the 
case	study	locations:
1. Conflicts between members of the farmer 
groups	 and	 their	 coordinators.	 Such	
conflicts revolved around the use of 
funds and profit sharing. The pivotal role 
played	 by	 coordinators	 meant	 that	 they	
automatically	 received	 the	 largest	 share.	
In	many	cases	irregularities	occurred	when	
coordinators	 used	 fees	 paid	 by	 working	
partners	for	their	own	personal	interests.	A	
case	like	this	caused	controversy	in	Mekar	
Pelita	 village;	 it	 had	 yet	 to	 be	 resolved	
when	this	study	was	conducted.
2. Conflict over village borders. Conflicts 
of	 this	 sort	 were	 caused	 when	 100-ha	
HPHHs	were	issued	for	forests	belonging	
to	 neighbouring	 villages.	 This	 occurred	
as	 a	 result	 of	 unclear	village	borders	 and	
the	survey	team	not	doing	its	job	properly,	
often	by	failing	to	conduct	any	surveys	in	
the field. We found that this had caused 
conflicts between Mekar Pelita and Bora 
villages,	and	between	Pekawai	and	Mekar	
Pelita	 villages.	 In	 both	 cases	 tension	
between	 the	 two	 villages	 mounted	 when	
timber	was	 logged	 or	 transported	 from	 a	
forest	area	nearby,	at	which	point	the	other	
village	 claimed	 that	 the	 timber	 had	 been	
taken	 from	 its	 HPHH	 concession	 area.	
This	 has	 impacted	 to	 some	 extent	 on	 the	
previously	 tranquil	 relationships	 between	
these	communities.	
3. Conflict between the farmer groups and 
working	partners.	These	generally	revolved	
around	 farmer	 groups	 protesting	 when	
working	 partners	 reneged	 on	 working	
agreements.	 Examples	 included	 partners	
failing	 to	 adhere	 to	 agreed	 schedules,	
or	 changing	 block	 felling	 timetables.	
Erna	 Djuliawati,	 a	 partner	 HPH	 timber	
company,	 faced	 a	 large	 demonstration	by	
local	communities	when	it	gave	precedence	
to	 felling	 in	 a	 Pekawai	 village	 block.	
According	to	the	felling	schedule,	it	should	
have	felled	this	after	it	had	felled	a	block	in	
Mekar	Pelita	village.
4. Conflict over tebok	forests.	Farmer	groups	
from	Nanga	Sayan	and	Senain	villages	both	
laid	 claim	 to	 the	 same	 plot	 of	 customary	
Income Source Number of 
HPHH permits
Cost per 
unit (Rp.)
Total
(Rp.)
HPHH permit applications 602 150 000 90 300 000
Pre-felling taxes paid on HPHH permits 602 960 000 577 920 000
PSDH timber tax and Reforestation Fund - - 100 000 000 000
Sintang District Government earnings 100 668 220 000
Table 8. Sintang District Government’s estimated earnings from HPHHs (2000–2003)
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land.	 This	 disputed	 stand	 of	 forest	 was	
also officially managed by an HPH timber 
concessionaire,	 KSK.	 Senain	 village’s	
farmer	 group	 took	 the	 timber	 company	
to	 the	 Sintang	District	 Court,	 demanding	
damages	for	the	timber	that	had	been	felled.	
The	 court	 found	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 Senain	
village’s	farmer	group	because	of	the	proof	
of	 ownership	 it	 possessed.	 However,	 the	
neighbouring	 Nanga	 Sayan	 farmer	 group	
has	 accused	 the	 Senain	 group	 of	 stealing	
its customary forest and profiting from the 
KSK	 timber	 company.	 However,	 Nanga	
Sayan	 has	 not	 taken	 the	 Senain	 group	 to	
court	over	the	issue;	they	told	us	that	they	
could	 not	 afford	 to	 do	 so.	By	 the	 end	 of	
2003 this conflict over ownership of tebok	
forest	had	yet	to	be	resolved.	
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5 	DISCUSSION AND DEBATE
5.1 Forest resources: on the 
verge of extinction?
As	 described	 in	 earlier	 sections,	 the	
complexities	 of	 forest	 resource	 management	
under	 decentralization	 are	 manifold.	 One	
root	 cause	 is	 the	 legal	 and	political	 situation.	
Legal	ambiguities	continue	to	cause	struggles	
between	the	central	and	regional	governments.	
Low	 levels	 of	 trust	 between	 Jakarta	 and	 the	
regions	 have	 also	 led	 to	 problems	 in	 central	
and	regional	government	relations.
One	 very	 interesting	 case	 is	 that	 of	 the	
Sintang	 District	 Head’s	 decision	 to	 withhold	
timber	taxes	and	Reforestation	Funds.	Instead	
of	depositing	them	with	the	Ministry	of	Forestry	
in	 Jakarta,	 timber	 taxes	 and	 Reforestation	
Funds	were	 deposited	 in	 the	 Sintang	District	
Government’s	 treasury	 account.	 These	 funds	
originated	from	levies	collected	from	HPHHs.	
The	 total	 withheld	 between	 2000	 and	 2002	
amounted	to	approximately	Rp.	46.7	billion11.	
Between	2002	and	May	2004	the	total	amount	of	
PSDH	timber	tax	withheld	was	approximately	
Rp.	 96	 billion,	 with	 Reforestation	 Funds	 at	
US$	16	000	or	approximately	Rp.	136	million,	
therefore	 the	 total	 funds	 withheld	 reached	
around	Rp.	100	billion12.	
The	 Sintang	District	Government	 argued	
that	 it	 had	 withheld	 these	 funds	 because	 the	
central	government	had	failed	to	reimburse	the	
district’s	PSDH	and	DR	funds	for	1999/2000.	
They	also	argued	that	when	funds	had	been	re-
allocated	back	to	them	from	Jakarta	they	were	
often	late	in	coming,	and	when	they	did	arrive	
they	 could	 not	 be	 used	 in	 other	 development	
programmes.	 The	 aim	 of	 withholding	 these	
funds	 was	 so	 that	 the	 central	 government,	
through	the	Minister	of	Forestry,	would	allow	
Sintang	 District	 Government	 to	 deduct	 32%	
of	PSDH	timber	tax	and	40%	of	Reforestation	
Funds directly, as specified for contributing 
regions	 in	 national	 Government	 Regulation	
No.	 35/2002.	The	 district	 initially	 hoped	 that	
forestry	decentralization	could	lead	to	increased	
district	income	as	it	still	had	substantial	areas	
of	forest.	Deducting	its	share	of	forest	revenues	
from	HPHHs	at	source	was	one	way	of	keeping	
its	new	entitlement,	without	 relying	on	 funds	
reimbursed	by	Jakarta.
Reformasi	 euphoria	 also	 led	 district	
stakeholders	to	believe	they	had	opportunities	
to	enjoy	what	 they	had	never	enjoyed	before.	
Expressions	 like	‘the	 time	has	come	for	 local	
people	to	enjoy	forest	resources’	were	frequently	
used	 to	 justify	 exploiting	 those	 resources.	
District	governments	and	stakeholders	used	the	
authority	given	to	them	to	issue	100-ha	HPHH	
permits	 to	 engage	 in	 rapid	 exploitation.	 This	
was	because	they	feared	policies	might	change	
again	and	they	wanted	to	make	the	most	of	the	
opportunity to manage and profit from their 
own	timber	resources	while	they	lasted.
In	addition	to	existing	problems	resulting	
from	 poor	 management	 of	 HPH	 concessions	
and	uncontrolled	large-scale	forest	conversions	
in	 the	 past,	 the	 new	 IUPHHKs	 and	 100-ha	
HPHHs	put	added	pressure	on	forests	in	West	
Kalimantan	 as	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 Indonesia	
(Barr	 et al.	 2001;	 Casson	 2001;	 McCarthy	
2001a,	b,	2004,	etc.).	This	pressure	was	caused	
mainly	 by	 the	 overlapping	 and	 confusing	
administrative	system,	and	by	misuse	of	power	
by	 the	district	 government.	 In	 the	 centralized	
era	 of	 forest	 management	 local	 forests	 were	
heavily	exploited,	but	the	district	governments	
and	 local	 people	 received	 very	 little.	 It	 was	
common	that	the	district	governments	saw	the	
HPHH	policy	 as	 a	window	of	 opportunity	 to	
reap	as	much	revenue	as	possible	before	central	
goverment	revoked	their	rights.	
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As	 discussed	 earlier,	 HPHHs,	 especially	
those	in	Sintang	District,	strayed	far	from	their	
intended objectives. This is reflected in the 
pseudo	partnerships	between	the	farmer	groups	
and	working	 partners.	 In	many	 cases,	 farmer	
groups	 asked	 only	 for	 fees	 on	 the	 amount	 of	
timber	felled	by	partners.	 It	was	easy	 to	 trick	
the	farmer	groups,	as	timber	potential	surveys	
were	 not	 conducted	 properly	 and	 often	 only	
carried	 out	 on	 paper.	There	was	 no	way	 that	
a	farmer	group	could	prove	how	much	timber	
had	been	exploited.	
It	is	not	surprising	that	the	new	system	of	
issuing	 central	 HPHs	 and	 local	 HPHHs	 has	
had	such	a	negative	impact	on	forest	resources.	
The	 Melawi	 District	 Head	 acknowledged	
these	 negative	 effects	 in	 a	 1-day	 workshop	
presented	 in	 Nanga	 Pinoh	 on	 21	April	 2004	
when	he	said,	‘100-ha	HPHHs	are	essentially	
flawed, as they are orientated towards looking 
at	timber	as	a	commodity.’	In	other	words,	the	
same	model	 of	 extractive	 forest	management	
used	under	the	New	Order	has	continued	since	
decentralization.	
Weak	 supervisory	 systems	 and	 high	
levels	 of	 legal	 ambiguity	have	 also	 increased	
opportunities	 for	 corruption,	 collusion	 and	
nepotism.	The	abuse	of	the	survey	system	is	one	
good	example.	Moreover,	in	this	complex	new	
legal	regime	it	has	been	impossible	to	improve	
standards	 of	 law	 enforcement.	As	 a	 result	 of	
continued	 problems	 with	 law	 enforcement	
and	the	complex	and	ambiguous	nature	of	the	
overlapping	legal	systems,	illegal	loggers	feel	
unimpeded	 by	 the	 authorities	 –	 authorities	
whose	corruption	also	means	that	organizations	
operating	without	legal	permits	for	logging	can	
simply	buy	their	way	out	of	trouble.	
Corruption	 must	 be	 tackled,	 but	 without	
strict	supervision	or	heavy	sanctions	for	illegal	
loggers	it	will	almost	certainly	be	impossible	to	
eradicate illegal logging. It will be difficult to 
eradicate	until	villagers	have	secure,	recognized	
tenure	over	 forest	 and	 land	 resources.	Unless	
villagers	 have	 secure	 access	 to	 and	 control	
over	 these	 resources	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 the	
current	group	of	stakeholders	will	bring	about	
sustainable	forest	management	between	them.	
It	will	 also	 be	 very	 important	 for	 the	 district	
governments	 to	 promote	 other	 sources	 of	
income	 for	 local	 communities.	 Developing	
estate crop plantations, husbandry and fisheries 
would	provide	alternative	sources	of	income.	
All	in	all	these	complexities	lead	to	a	bleak	
outlook	 for	 forest	 management	 (Handadhari	
1999).	 Not	 without	 reason	 do	 many	 parties	
feel	pessimistic	about	prospects	for	sustainable	
forest	management	 in	 the	midst	 of	 continued	
corruption	 and	 policy	 failure,	 more	 legal	
uncertainty	 and	 the	 race	 between	 central	 and	
the	 district	 governments	 to	 exploit	 forests	 in	
the	regions.
5.2 Community involvement: 
appearance vs. reality
Decentralization	 raised	 high	 hopes	 that	
communities	would	be	able	to	participate	more	
in	forest	resource	management,	and	that	greater	
involvement	would	allow	them	to	enjoy	direct	
benefits from forest management. Beyond 
receiving	 minimal	 cash	 payouts	 from	 forest	
exploitation for the first time, for the poorest 
community	members	these	hopes	are	a	far	cry	
from	reality.	
Genuine	community	involvement	in	100-
ha	HPHHs	appears	minimal.	The	central	roles	
are	 played	 by	 farmer	 group	 coordinators	 and	
working	partners	such	as	old	HPH	concession	
holders	 and	 timber	brokers.	Communities	are	
in	 a	very	passive	position	and	cannot	 control	
decisions	 made	 by	 the	 group	 coordinators	
because	 no	 strong	 community-level	 forest	
management	 institutions	 have	 been	 formed.	
Traditional	management	systems	(such	as	tebok	
forest)	 were	 sidelined	 for	 30	 years,	 and	 the	
remaining	 local	 institutions	have	been	unable	
to	 respond	 to	 recent	 rapid	developments.	The	
communities’	 roles	 are	 limited	 to	 receiving	 a	
share	of	the	fees	from	HPHH	activities.
The majority of profits from HPHHs are 
enjoyed	 by	 elite	 groups	 such	 as	 the	 group	
coordinators,	 group	 chairpersons,	 working	
partners	and	timber	entrepreneurs.	The	Melawi	
District	 Head	 talked	 about	 this	 inequitable	
profit sharing from HPHHs	 saying,	 ‘the	
tendency	 is	 for	 the	 economic	 conditions	 of	
those	not	involved	in	the	timber	business	to	fall	
far	behind	those	of	those	who	are’.	
In	 some	 cases	 the	 group	 coordinators	
diverted	 funds	 for	 their	 own	 interests;	 again,	
it	 was	 villagers	 who	 lost	 out.	 Resosudarmo	
(2004) confirmed this when she concluded 
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that the main beneficiaries were not local 
communities	but	those	who	had	the	capital	to	
organize	 HPHH	 permits.	 These	 were	 mainly	
brokers	 and	 the	 old	 HPH	 concessionaires’	
working	partners.	 In	addition,	villagers	suffer	
most	 from	 the	 environmental	 impacts	 of	
unsustainable	logging.
When	 it	 came	 to	 implementing	 100-ha	
HPHH	 policy,	 it	 was	 unlikely	 to	 achieve	 its	
objective	of	providing	local	communities	with	
a	 fair	 income	 from	 forest	 management.	 The	
policy	was	not	based	on	community	interests:	
the	 process	 of	 drafting	 this	 policy	 in	 Sintang	
was	 instead	 dominated	 by	 the	 interests	 of	
village	 and	 district-level	 power	 holders	 and	
other	elite	groups.	Input	to	the	District	Head’s	
Decree No 19/1999 came only from officials 
in	the	Sintang	District	Forestry	and	Plantations	
Office, and the economic and legal divisions 
of	 the	District	Secretariat.	Likewise,	once	 the	
policy	was	complete,	communities	living	in	or	
around	the	forests	were	hardly	involved	in	100-
ha	HPHH	applications,	evaluation	processes	or	
the final exploitation of the forests. 
It	seems	that	decrees	that	can	be	made	at	
the	District	Head’s	 discretion	 do	 not	 provide	
sufficient foundations for forest resource 
management	 policies.	 These	 policies	 should	
be	 regulated	 in	higher	 rulings	such	as	district	
regulations,	 which	 have	 to	 be	 approved	 by	
the	democratically	elected	district	parliament.	
Most	importantly,	district	forestry	policies	will	
not	work	 in	 favour	of	 the	poor	until	 they	are	
based	on	their	needs.	This	will	 require	public	
participation	in	policy-making	processes.	
Lacking	in	democratic	accountability	and	
public	input,	Sintang’s	HPHH	policy	has	only	
improved access to forest benefits for village 
power	 holders	 and	 local	 elites.	 The	 poorest	
community	members’	access	to	forest	resources	
has	not	improved.	This	is	far	from	the	intended	
impact	of	this	policy.	
Notwithstanding	 this	 elite	 group	
domination,	100-ha	HPHHs	did,	 in	 fact,	 give	
members of local communities their first 
opportunity	to	claim	a	stake	in	forest	resource	
exploitation	in	over	30	years.	This	has	inevitably	
led to conflicts and disagreements over control 
of	 forest	 resources	 at	 the	 local	 level,	 and	 the	
mechanisms	for	legitimizing	claims	and	sharing	
profits could be much fairer. 
The	100-ha	HPHH	case	in	Sayan	Subdistrict	
shows	 that	 only	 those	 community	 members	
who	own	customary	damar tebok	 forests	 can	
enjoy benefits from 100-ha HPHHs. Only 
community	members	who	could	prove	that	their	
family	had	tapped	resin	for	generations	–	back	
to	the	Dutch	colonial	times	–	were	eligible	for	
an	HPHH	permit.	Allocating	HPHHs	in	damar 
tebok forests areas makes it difficult for other 
community	members	to	access	forest	resources	
because	they	have	to	obtain	the	permission	of	
the	 damar tebok	 owners.	 This	 fact	 supports	
McCarthy	 (2004),	 who	 said	 that	 regional	
autonomy	has	brought	customary	claims	to	the	
surface,	 with	 local	 communities	 demanding	
back	the	rights	they	had	lost	for	more	than	30	
years.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 tebok	 forest,	 customary	
claims	are	dominated	by	certain	groups,	causing	
further	marginalization	 of	 others	 who	 cannot	
prove	tebok	forest	rights.	Whilst	the	new	policy	
has	undoubtedly	opened	up	new	opportunities,	
within	 village	 communities	 access	 to	 forest	
resources	has	not	been	equitable.	
The	 100-ha	 HPHHs	 have	 inevitably	
brought with them new conflicts, the most 
common being conflict over village borders, 
especially	 when	 HPHH	 permit	 locations	
overlap.	As	village	claims	were	not	recognized	
under	 the	 New	 Order,	 decentralization	 has	
brought	 the	 issue	 of	 demarcating	 village	
borders	to	the	fore.	It	seems	that	neighbouring	
villages	need	to	initiate	negotiations	to	clarify	
their borders to prevent further conflict. The 
policy	 on	 HPHHs	 raised	 the	 stakes.	 Whilst	
boundary	 surveys	 were	 indeed	 required,	 the	
practice of paying premium prices for fictitious 
surveys	has	 increased	 the	number	of	cases	of	
contested	boundaries.	
It is only fitting that local communities as 
key	 stakeholders	 should	 be	 actively	 involved	
in finding solutions to these problems. Local 
community	 participation	 has	 to	 be	 increased,	
as	 only	 in	 this	 way	 will	 the	 communities	
feel the benefits of forest management under 
decentralization. It would require significant 
facilitation	and	support	for	local	communities	
to	 be	 able	 to	 input	 directly	 to	 district	 policy	
development.	 Beyond	 having	 their	 voices	
heard	at	 the	 local	 level,	what	 is	needed	 is	 far	
clearer	 local	 and	 national	 legal	 provisions	
recognizing	 and	 protecting	 the	 communities’	
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rights to benefit from and be involved in the 
management	of	their	local	forest	resources.
5.3  Towards good forest 
governance – a mission 
impossible?
The	 four	 pillars	 of	 good	 governance	 often	
used	 as	 benchmarks	 for	 the	 success	 of	 forest	
management	 are	 accountability,	 transparency,	
law	 enforcement	 and	 public	 participation.	
Tambunan	 (2000)	 and	 Mody	 (2004)	 have	
argued	that	decentralization	should	be	capable	
of	 bringing	 about	 good	 forest	 governance.	
It	 places	 decision	 makers	 closer	 to	 their	
constituents	 and	 increases	 opportunities	 for	
stakeholders	 to	 participate	 in	 local	 forest	
management.
There	are	still	many	obstacles	to	achieving	
good	 forest	 governance.	 Newly	 empowered	
district	decision	makers	are	not	yet	accountable	
as	they	do	not	necessarily	base	their	decisions	
on	their	constituents’	real	interests.	With	100-ha	
HPHHs	in	Sintang	District,	local	communities	
cannot	control	local	elites	because	there	are	no	
strong	 institutions	 that	 enable	 them	 to	 do	 so.	
Therefore,	 we	 conclude	 that	 decentralization	
has	brought	a	wider	range	of	local	actors	into	
forest	management	and	 increased	 the	number	
of people making a profit; but it has not 
automatically	improved	the	check-and-balance	
mechanisms	 for	 forest	 resource	management,	
nor	 has	 it	 brought	 the	 poorest	 stakeholders	
a	 voice	 in	 decision-making	 or	 a	 share	 of	 the	
profits.
Although	 decisions	 related	 to	 forest	
management	 through	 the	 100-ha	 HPHH	
policy	were	 taken	 at	 the	 district	 level,	 public	
participation	 in	 forest	 management	 and	
policy-making	 was	 still	 very	 limited.	 NGOs,	
customary	community	groups,	universities	and	
research	 institutions	 played	 no	 active	 role	 in	
policy	decision-making	in	Sintang.	Therefore,	
we may also conclude that there is significant 
room	 to	 improve	 public	 participation	 in	 the	
legal	aspects	of	forest	management.
The	 central	 roles	 in	 regulating	 and	
implementing	 the	 HPHH	 policy	 in	 Sintang	
District	 were	 played	 by	 local	 groups	 rather	
than	 by	 distant	 central	 administrators.	
However,	 the	 most	 powerful	 local	 players	
were	elite	groups	and	businessmen.	More	often	
than	not,	 local	communities	 lost	out	on	a	fair	
share of the benefits from HPHH activities 
because	 they	 were	 soft	 targets	 for	 stronger	
parties,	 such	 as	 farmer	 group	 chairpersons	
or	 coordinators.	 Furthermore,	 they	 have	 to	
face	 the	 consequences	 of	 damage	 caused	 by	
HPHHs,	 HPHs	 and	 unlicensed	 logging,	 such	
as floods, landslides, fires and river pollution, 
with	increasing	regularity.
Law enforcement has not significantly 
improved	 under	 decentralization.	 Regional	
law enforcement officers lack the readiness or 
capacity	to	control	forest	resource	management.	
This	has	often	led	to	reckless	implementation	of	
the	HPHH	policy.	With	two	concession	systems	
running	in	tandem	illegal	logging	has	become	
increasingly	prevalent,	 as	 shown	by	 the	 large	
number	of	distribution	points	for	illegal	timber	
discovered	 by	 the	 West	 Kalimantan	 Illegal	
Logging	 Investigation	Team.	Moreover,	 local	
oknums (officials prepared to act corruptly or 
misuse	their	power)	are	becoming	increasingly	
involved	in	these	activities.
A	 critical	 problem	 has	 also	 been	 the	
shortage of law enforcement officers in the 
district.	Another	factor	has	been	a	lack	of	clarity	
in	the	national	and	district	regulations	over	who	
should	have	been	ultimately	responsible	for	law	
enforcement.	This	has	been	disastrous	in	an	era	
when	responsibility	for	forest	exploitation	has	
been	divided	between	the	central	administration	
(managing	 large-scale	 HPH	 permits)	 and	 the	
district	 government	 (managing	 small-scale	
community-based	HPHH	permits).	
Our	 research	 also	 highlighted	 several	
areas	where	 transparency	could	be	 improved.	
Where	 it	 is	 available,	 information	 about	 how	
policies	are	made	and	 implemented	and	what	
mechanisms	are	used	for	distributing	economic	
benefits should be made clearer. More often 
than	not,	 information	 is	 simply	not	 available.	
Transparency	 has	 yet	 to	 become	 a	 core	
characteristic	of	forest	resource	management	in	
West	Kalimantan.	Elite	groups	still	hold	central	
roles and there is no smooth flow of relevant 
information	to	and	from	legitimate	stakeholders.	
This	is	evident	from	the	lack	of	involvement	of	
local	communities	 in	 the	production	of	either	
the	national	or	district	policies	regulating	100-
ha	HPHHs.	Nor	did	local	communities	play	a	
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genuine	 part	 in	 implementing	 these	 policies.	
Their	 position	was	weak	 as	 they	 had	 neither	
the	 capacity	 nor	 capital	 to	 run	 a	 small-scale	
concession.	This	left	them	open	to	exploitation	
by	 wealthier	 and	 more	 experienced	 actors.	
Furthermore,	 no	 information	 reached	 them	
regarding	 the	 planning,	 implementation	 and	
evaluation	 of	 these	 activities.	 These	 factors	
have	 limited	 transparency	 and	 accountability	
in	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 100-ha	 HPHH	
policy	 in	 this	 district,	 and	 the	poorest	 groups	
have	seen	little	improvement	in	their	lot.	
There	 is	 still	 a	great	deal	of	groundwork	
needed	to	overcome	the	challenges	to	equitable	
and	 inclusive	 forest	 resource	 management	
in	 Sintang	 District	 and	 elsewhere	 in	 West	
Kalimantan.	McCarthy	(2004)	was	not	wrong	
when	he	wrote	that	forest	resource	management	
following	 decentralization	 is	 still	 far	 from	
achieving	its	objective	of	good	governance.	
Local	 governments	 still	 need	 to	 build	
their	capacity	to	stimulate	and	increase	public	
participation	in	forest	resource	policy-making.	
Local	institutions	need	to	be	strengthened	as	the	
main	step	forward	in	ensuring	that	they	have	a	
say	 in	 forest	 resources	management.	There	 is	
also	 scope	 for	 NGOs,	 research	 organizations	
and	 universities	 to	 become	more	 involved	 in	
the	 process	 of	 drafting	 policies	 and	 inputting	
valuable	 information	 about	 socio-economic	
and	economic	conditions	on	 the	ground.	This	
input	would	help	local	decision	makers	to	draft	
policies	that	protect	local	communities’	interests	
and	rights.	This	would	make	local	people	less	
vulnerable	 to	 exploitation	 by	 dominant	 local	
and	external	elites.	
Information flows also need to be 
developed	as	the	basis	for	achieving	transparent	
forest	 management.	 Finally,	 immediate	
efforts	 are	 required	 to	 strengthen	 and	 clarify	
responsibilities	for	law	enforcement.	This	will	
be	the	key	to	ensuring	that	forest	management	
practices	 do	 not	 deviate	 from	 the	 prevailing	
rules.
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6.1 Conclusions
Decentralization	 has	 provided	 new	 space	 for	
regional	governments	to	organize	and	manage	
their	own	forest	resources.	The	number	of	local	
actors	involved	in	forest	resources	management	
has	 also	 increased.	 However,	 many	 district	
governments	correctly	feared	that	the	Ministry	
of	Forestry	would	quickly	move	to	recentralize	
the	forestry	sector	and	that	their	authority	might	
be	 short-lived.	 In	 this	 climate	 of	 suspicion,	
forest	 resources	 were	 targeted	 for	 regional	
own-source	 revenues	 (PAD).	This	was	driven	
partly	by	their	need	to	meet	the	shortfall	caused	
by	the	reduction	in	development	subsidies	from	
central	government.	
Local	 policies	 have	 followed	 the	
longstanding	 national	 tendency	 to	 prioritize	
timber	extraction	over	sustainable	management.	
There	has	also	been	a	lack	of	commitment	to,	
and	clarity	in,	the	division	of	law	enforcement	
responsibilities.	 These	 factors	 have	 led	 to	
unsustainable	forest	exploitation.	Finally,	weak	
provisions	 for	 protecting	 local	 communities’	
interests	 have	 seen	 national	 and	 local	 elites	
capturing benefits at the expense of the poorest 
community members. Conflicts have also been 
caused	 by	 a	 profusion	 of	 overlaps	 between	
centrally	managed	HPH	concessions,	district-
issued	 HPHH	 concessions	 and	 reclaimed	
customary	boundaries.	
The	 abuse	 of	 the	 HPHH	 policy	 by	
powerful	stakeholders,	ambiguities	in	the	legal	
framework,	 and	 overlapping	 areas	 of	 central	
and	local	authority	have	combined	to	make	it	
difficult to interpret and implement national 
and	district	forest	policies.	This	has	paved	the	
way	 for	 widespread	 policy	 abuse	 and	 illegal	
logging.	All	of	these	factors	have	placed	greater	
pressure	on	 forest	 resources.	This	 is	 apparent	
from	the	growing	areas	of	degraded	forest	land	
across	West	Kalimantan.	
Decentralization	 raised	 expectations	 for	
more	 stakeholder	 involvement	 in	 creating,	
implementing	 and	 evaluating	 forestry	 sector	
policies.	In	reality,	power	has	remained	largely	
in	 the	 hands	 of	 national	 corporate	 elites,	 and	
new	opportunities	have	been	hijacked	by	local	
elites.	 All	 in	 all,	 community	 roles	 remain	
extremely	minimal.	Policy	making	in	Sintang	
district	 followed	 the	 exclusive	 model	 typical	
of	 the	New	Order	 regime.	Although	 taken	 at	
the	 local	 level,	 decisions	 were	 still	 made	 as	
they	 always	 had	 been.	There	was	 no	 process	
of	public	consultation.	The	district	government	
provided	 no	 room	 for	 check-and-balance	
mechanisms	to	protect	communities’	interests.	
Ineffective	 law	 enforcement,	 corruption	 and	
weak	local	institutions	threaten	the	chances	of	
ever	 establishing	 a	 sustainable	 and	 equitable	
forest	management	regime	in	Sintang.	Failure	
to	 control	 unlicensed	 logging	 and	 reinvest	
profits in reforestation and community income 
generation	will	move	 the	 situation	closer	 and	
closer	to	the	point	of	no	return	in	this	district.
Forest	resource	management	has	increased	
PAD	since	the	introduction	of	decentralization	
across	West	Kalimantan.	However,	 the	 short-
lived economic benefits of the 100-ha HPHHs 
were	 not	 distributed	 equitably.	 Only	 certain	
parties enjoyed the largest share of profits 
from	 HPHHs.	 Others	 have	 captured	 HPHH	
profits for their personal use. Furthermore, 
pseudo	 partnerships	 were	 in	 reality	 still	
dominated	 by	 the	 old	 actors,	 notably	 central	
HPH	 concessionaires.	 Local	 communities	 did	
not gain their share of the intended benefits of 
this	policy.
Opening	 up	 an	 opportunity	 for	 local	
stakeholders to manage and profit from forest 
management	 through	 100-ha	 HPHHs	 lifted	
the	 lid	 on	 claims	 that	 had	been	 repressed	 for	
30 years. This inevitably led to new conflicts 
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between local stakeholders vying for benefits. 
We frequently discovered conflicts between 
the	 farmer	 group	 and	 its	 working	 partners	
over contractual agreements or profit sharing. 
Village border conflicts arose, especially in 
cases	where	HPHH	areas	overlapped	with	each	
other	or	with	existing	HPH	concessions.	
We	 also	 found	 internal	 community	
conflicts between those community members 
who	own	 tebok	 forests	and	 those	who	do	not	
because	 the	 tebok forest owners profit when 
100-ha	HPHH	concessions	are	granted	in	their	
areas.	 Although	 local	 communities	 receive	
some	 advantages	 from	 100-ha	 HPHHs,	 most	
benefits go to timber companies, local elites and 
government officials. The district government’s 
decision	 accepting	 only	 damar tebok	 forest	
rights	 holders	 for	 HPHH	 permits	 meant	 that	
communities	or	members	who	could	not	prove	
these	 rights	 received	 absolutely	 nothing.	 It	
would	have	been	fairer	to	devise	less	exclusive	
criteria	that	recognized	the	basic	right	of	local	
communities	 to	 earn	 a	 livelihood	 from	 their	
customary	 forests,	 regardless	of	whether	 they	
could	prove	 that	 they	 tapped	 resin	during	 the	
Dutch	colonial	times.	Ironically,	all	community	
members	will	suffer	equal	socio-economic	and	
ecological	 losses	 from	 the	 rapid	 loss	 of	 local	
forest	resources.	
This	 study	 shows	 that	 the	 four	 pillars	
of	 good	 governance,	 accountability,	
public	 participation,	 law	 enforcement	 and	
transparency,	 remained	 very	 distant	 during	
the	 implementation	 of	 the	 HPHH	 policy	 in	
Sintang.	 These	 challenges	 must	 be	 answered	
by	 increasing	district	 stakeholder	 cooperation	
and	involvement	in	forest	management.	More	
trust	needs	to	be	built	with	central	government	
to	 avoid	 competing	 interests	 and	 achieve	
greater	 synergy	 between	 different	 levels	 of	
government.	
6.2 Recommendations
1.	 To	 create	more	 robust	 policies	 and	 avoid	
policy	 abuse,	 efforts	 must	 be	 made	 to	
involve	 all	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 creation,	
implementation	and	evaluation	of	policies.	
To	this	end,	regional	governments	together	
with	 local	NGOs	or	universities	 can	play	
an	 important	 role	 in	 stimulating	 public	
participation.
2.	 With	 the	 steady	 depletion	 of	 forest	
resources	–	caused	by	boundary	overlaps,	
unclear	responsibility	for	law	enforcement	
and	 contradictions	 in	 national	 and	 local	
policies,	 illegal	 logging	 and	 timber	
smuggling	 –	 new	 mechanisms	 should	
be	 considered	 for	 monitoring	 timber	
extraction	 in	 West	 Kalimantan.	 The	
number	 and	 capacity	 of	 law	 enforcement	
officers needs to be increased. Cooperation 
with	Malaysia	should	be	improved	in	order	
to	minimize	 timber	 smuggling.	Degraded	
forest	lands	should	be	rehabilitated	through	
reforestation	efforts,	while	protected	areas	
should	 be	 established	 and	 efforts	 made	
towards	 creating	 alternative	 community	
livelihoods	opportunities	from	non-timber	
forest	development,	including	ecotourism.
3. Although the profits from timber exploitation 
have for the first time been available to some 
local	community	members,	the	poorest	local	
community	members	 still	 did	 not	 enjoy	 a	
share of the benefits from the HPHH policy 
(one	of	 the	 few	examples	of	decentralized	
forest	 management).	 Therefore	 more	
thought	 should	 be	 put	 into	 strengthening	
customary	forest	management	systems	and	
developing	mechanisms	to	ensure	equitable	
benefits distribution and investment for the 
future.	We	 suggest	 that	 local	 governments	
recognize	customary	forests	as	one	form	of	
decentralized	 forest	 resource	management.	
Traditional	 management	 systems	 have	
proved	to	be	more	environmentally	sensitive	
and	 sustainable;	 they	 should	 therefore	 be	
revitalized.
4.	 Local	 institutions	 have	 lagged	 far	 behind	
other	 groups	 in	 response	 to	 the	 rapid	
developments	 under	 decentralization.	 We	
feel	 that	 strong	 local	 institutions	 should	
be	 developed,	 with	 NGOs	 and	 research	
organizations	playing	important	roles	in	this	
development.	Offering	training,	advice	and	
assistance are the first steps to building the 
capacity	of	local	community	institutions.
5.	 Stakeholder	 dialogues	 should	 be	
developed	 to	 increase	 transparency	 in	
forest	management	 in	 the	 era	 of	 regional	
autonomy.	Such	dialogues	would	hopefully	
improve	 relations	 and	 build	 trust	 among	
stakeholders.
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7 ENDNOTES
1	 DFID,	 1999.	 Indonesia: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management,	Final	Report	
of	 the	 Senior	 Management	 Advisory	 Team	
and	 the	Provincial	Level	Forest	Management	
Project,	2	Vols.,	Department	 for	 International	
Development	(UK)	and	Department	of	Forestry,	
Jakarta.
2	 Melawi was officially established as 
a	new	district	following	a	plenary	meeting	of	
the	 DPR	 RI	 (Central	 Legislative	 Assembly)	
on	20	November	2003.	After	Melawi	District	
officially separated, Nanga Pinoh Subdistrict 
was	 chosen	 as	 its	 administrative	 capital.	
Melawi	District	consists	of	seven	subdistricts:	
Nanga	Pinoh,	Belimbing,	Sayan,	Tanah	Pinoh,	
Sokan,	Menukung	and	Ella	Hilir.
3	 Local	 communities	 extract	 timber	 and	
use	 chainsaws	 to	 cut	 it	 into	 uniform	 lengths	
which	 are	 then	 sold	 to	 brokers	 who	 own	
sawmills.	This	activity	is	commonplace	during	
times	 of	 high	 water	 because	 it	 is	 easier	 to	
transport	the	timber	at	this	time.
4	 Regarding	Transfer	of	Forestry	Matters	
to	Regional	Governments.
5	 Regarding	 Forest	 Concessions	 and	
Extraction	of	Forest	Resources	from	Production	
Forests,	issued	in	January	1999.	Law	No.	22/99	
was	issued	in	May	1999.		
6	 Law	No.	41/1999	caused	controversy	in	
various	circles.	Some	felt	that	the	law	was	not	in	
the	spirit	of	regional	autonomy	because	many	
of	 its	 provisions	 still	 required	 administrative	
approval	 from	 Jakarta	 (read:	 Department	 of	
Forestry).	
7	 This	 division	 of	 village	 forests	 often	
contradicts	 the	 West	 Kalimantan	 Provincial	
Government’s	 forest	 region	 distribution	
map.	 For	 instance,	 several	 customary	 forest	
locations	 in	Madya	 Raya	 village	 are	 marked	
inside	 conservation	 forests	 on	 the	 provincial	
forest	region	distribution	map.
8	 Ulayat	has	several	meanings	but	can	be	
interpreted	as	“local	area	or	region”.
9	 Tebok	 comes	 from	 the	 word	menebok 
meaning	to	pierce	(to	tap).
10	 Written	 evidence	 in	 the	 form	 of	 tax	
receipts	 from	 the	 Dutch	 colonial	 times	 have	
been	 used	 as	 proof	 of	 ownership	 rights,	
strengthening	tenure	over	tebok	forest	when	the	
100-ha	HPHHs	were	 introduced.	Community	
elders’	stories	provided	unwritten	evidence,	so	
tebok	 forest	heirs	prepared	written	statements	
from	 the	 elders,	 who	 signed	 them	 to	 prove	
that	inheritance	claims	over	tebok	forests	were	
genuine.
11	 Kompas,	7	June	2002.	Tiga Kabupaten 
Tidak Setor Dana PSDH/DR	 (No	 PSDH/DR	
Funds	Deposited	in	Three	Districts).
12	 Kompas,	19	May	2004.	Bupati Sintang 
Tahan Dana PSDH dan DR (Sintang	District	
Head	Witholds	PSDH	and	DR	Funds).
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9 ANNEX 1.  KEY INFORMANTS
No Key Informants Number
1. Subdistrict civil servants 4
2. Sayan and Nanga Pinoh Subdistrict Heads 2
3. Village heads 7
4. Other civil servants 1
5. Security officers 1
6. Legislative assembly members 1
7. Customary heads 2
8. Village elders 2
9. KUT coordinators 7
10. KUT member farmers 21
11. Non-KUT farmers 9
12. 100-ha HPHH working partners 2
13. HPH concessionaires 2
14. Sintang District Forestry Officials 3
15. West Kalimantan Province Forestry Officials 4
16. Melawi District Regional Secretary 2
17. Sintang District Regional Secretary 2
18. Local Advisory Groups 4
Total 71
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